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ANNEX
frrtroductLo
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this report, which has been drawn up
pursuant to article 21 of the 1969 lnternal Agreement on the
financing and management of Community aid, is to provide the
council of the communlties with inforrnation on the conditions in
which this aid was implemented in L9?j by the recipients 
- 
the
Associated States and the Overseas Countries and Territories -
and on the use made of projects financed by the Fund.
I. In L973 the implementation of aid continued at the same pace
as during the previous year. Financing decisions taken Ln l-971
brought overall conmitments from the resources of the thlrd
Fund to 7Al of the total bud.get appropriation for the second
Yaound6 Convention. In I9?t total contracts for the three Funris
showed a substantial increase on the previous year. Disbursenents
also increased in 197J, thus confirming the increased. rate of
aid impl ementat j-on.
Total comrnitments from the resources of the three Funds over
the first 1l years amount to approximately 2 OOO million u.a.
while d.isbursements total approximately 1 4OO million u.a.
In I97) the Commission continued to adopt measures designed
to reduce the frequency and extent of overspendinE on certain
projects financed by the Fund for this has always been one of
the Commissionr s rnain points of concern. Although in 197] the
additional funds required to cover these excess costs stilL
amounted to approximately the same total as in 1972 and there
was a reduction in the net extra cost arising f rorn contraets,
such favourable results should nevertheless be treated with
caution, since they do not take j.nto consideration contracts
being perfo rmed.
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The commlssion has already adopted certain precautionary measures
to rnake as much allowance as possible for the effects Of widespread
inflation and increased enerry prices since these are bound to affect
proJects in progress.
II. During I9?3 lrle commission continued its study of the use made of
projects financed by the community in the Associated countries and
Territories. The value of this work, which is carried on continuously
and j-n cooperation with the authorities of the recipient countriest
lies in the fact that it enables the Commission to remedy any
shortcomings and to draw lessons for channelling the aid granted
and integratin6g it nore effectively in the development strategies
applied by the various recipient countries.
The seconrl part of this report reYiews seventeen agricultural
development 6chemes caried out in nine different countries. In
view of the conplexity of the problems posed by the conception and
implementation of agricultural deveLopment projectsf the schemes
have been arranged in three groups to enable the best possible
comparison to be made of their conceptiont implementation and
results. The conclusions which nay be drawn from the analysis of
these schemes are set out at the end of the chapters devoted to
each group (or at the end of the section on proiects not falling
into any of the three grouPs).
Alf the schemes helped develop agricultural productiont increased
the market value of ap5ricultural products and improve stock-breeding.
tr'ron the technical , operational and functional angles, the execution
and use nade of these projeets rnay be consideredr in most casest
to have been in line with the objectlves set. Although the results
of the projects appear therefore to be mainly positive, some of them
were not as fruitful as they rnight have been owing to bad and
lmpredictable weather conditions or to operating problems in cases
where projects were not sufficiently adapted to the locaI situation.
In the case of bad weathert involving uncontrollable external
factorsr analysis of the resul-ts of projects ls a difficult and
delioate mat te r.
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As regards operating problems, the authorities in the associated
countries are striving to pay even closer attention to the
conditions of leadership, supervisionr information, marketing and
pro jectr.Bintenance. This moreover backs up the Commissionrs efforts
to seek to integrate EDF-projects as comprehensively as possible
into the socio-economic context of the area or country of which
they are to become part.
The Conmission also considers it of the utmost importance that the
associated countries should put up projects for financing from EDF
fesources within the franework of coherent programmes r which would
take particular account of the need to ensllre that projects function
and are maintained properly by providing adequate financial resources
and qualified loca1 staff for them. With regard to the latter pointt
agricultural development projects are frequently supplemented - in
accordance with the guidelines laid down by the Association Council -
by technical assistance programmes, for example involving the
supervision and training of African staff capable of running these
projects. Sirnilarly, in its programme of scholarships and in-
service traini.ng grants, the Commissi,on seeks to give priority to
scholarships for trainings related to capital projects. Such
trainings are in any case confined to agriculturalr economic and
technical subjects according to the priority scale of the Associated
State in question. Approximately two-third"s of the scholarship
holders or trainees receive thej-r training in African institutest
study centres or unive rs i ti es.
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PART ONE
CONDITIONS OF A]D, IUPI,EIIU'ITATION
l-n :.973 the Comrnission continued its efforts of
to speed up the implementation of Community aid
effective.
the
and
past few years
to make it more
The results obtained in the financing of projects show that these
efforts have begun to bear fruit (Chapter I). fire Commission
continued to pay close attention to cases of overspending on certain
projects financed by the three Fundst and the study of this phenomenon
which it had submitted the previous year was brought up to date
(Chapter II). Fina11y1 the Commission adopted certain measures to
counter, as far as possible, the effect of increased prices on the
Fundrs f i.nancing operations (Chapter lII).
CHAPTER 1 
- 
RESULTS OI' FTNANC]NG OPERATIONS
The implementation of Community aid in l9?3 was marked, as in the
previous yeart by a particularly high rate of commitments from the
resources of the thlld EDF.
l. Financing decisions adopted in 1971 in favour of the A.ASM and the
OCT and OD totalled 201 mi]llon u.a. f rorn the three Funds. Total
commitments entered into in 197] under the third EDF alone
amounted to 2OO million u.a. After three yearrs operations r total
cumulated commitments from the resources of this Fund arnount'
therefore, to approximately 540 mj.llion u.a. or 7 A/o of the overa{I
appropriation for the second Yaound6 Convention. This result
suggests that when the Convention expires on JI January 1975,,
the funds earmarked
cornmitted.
for the third EDF uill have been fu11y
)
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Total contracts placed it l97J under the three Funrls amounted to
214 million u.a. in other words an increase of rnore lhan jTl over
the previous yea r.
]. Disbursements under the three Funds in 1971 amounted to
approximately 160 million u.a., representi.ng an increase over
the previous year of 145 million u.a.
4. At the end of the fifteen years covered by the three Conventions,
the balance-sheet of the three Funds might be summarized as
follows : under the commitments entered into in favour of the
AASM and the OCt and OD 
- 
amounting to approximately 2 O00
million u.a. 
- 
11OO invitations to tender have been is.sued. and
! fOO works supply and se::vice contracts placed, performance of
which has involved disbursements in the reeion of l. +0O mill-ion
CHAPTER II - OVERSPT]NDING
During discussion within the Councilrs AASM-t-IN ldorking Party
of the general study on overspendi-ng drawn up by the Comnission in
I97It it was agreed that the Commj.ssionrs annual report to the
Councii[ on the conditions of aid implementation and utilization
should include a statistical study on overspendi,ng.
Two methods were enployed in drawing up this study :
Firstt a l-ist was drawn up of those projects involving excess
expenditure for which supplementary funds were committed during
the L97j financial year following a decision by the Chief
Authorizing Officer or the Commissi.on.
Using a second, nore comprehensive approach, the Commission
attempted to establish for contracts performed under the three
Funds the net extra cost resultin6q from the additional expenditure
incurred as against any savings, both ,overall and by sector.
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I. Excess expenditure covered in 1977
In the I9?3 financial year, the Commissi.on (after consulting the
DDf' Commj.ttee) authorized the commitment of an overail- total of
lf.8 million u.a. to cover overspending on 20 second and third EDF
projects which had not yet been completed. These 2O projectst
representing a nominal amount of 79 mj.11ion u.a. included :
- 8 projects from the second EDFr representing a nominal amoount of
12.5 million u.a. on which overspending amounted to !.6 million
u.a. (aw/o)
- 
12 projects from the third
45.5 million u.a. on which
t^^/\u.a. \Yrc1.
Total overspending amounted. to 1'?.5% of the nominal amount for these
projects.
This overspending was covered by 2.) miLlion u.a. from the second
EDF and 1l .I mil].ion u.a. f rom the third EDF. Excess expenditure
thus covered in L9?3 totaLled '/% of t]ne 'overall amount involved in
financins' ciecisions taken in I97J under the three Funds (201 million
u.a.). If the total amount of excess expenditure covered it I)lJ by
the resources of the third EDF (lf.f mi:-f ion u.a.) is compared to
the total for financing decisions taken in the same year under the
third EDF (20O rnitlion u.a.)t the percentage is even sma1Ierl
amounting to only 5.6%. fnts result shoul-d be compared with llre 3.9o
and 17% recorded in 1972 and 1971 respectively.
The improvement observed during the preceding financial yearr due
to the measures which the Commission had been recomrnending for
several years to limit overspending was therefore confirned in 197f.
2. Net extra cost
In drawj ng up the balance sheer of the net extra cost to the EDF
resrrltinq from the addj rional expenditure incurred and any savings
made when the projects had been completed, reference was made, as
in the preceding year, to contracts under the first, second and
third EDF whj.ch had been finally closed.
a) From this ba]-ance sheet, covering 4 821 ccntracts for which the
accounts are closedt the following emerged :
EDF, representing a nominal- amount of
overspending amounted to 4.2 million
o)
-t-
- for 878 contracts (LB%), representing a nominal amount of 136.4
million u.a., total expenditure was 4OO.4 million u.a., revealing
overspending of 64 million u.a. (l-9.oM);
- 
for 15]-6 contracts (3I%), representing a norninal amount of
181.8 million u.a., total expenditure was 161.4 million u.a.,
reveal-ing a saving of 20.4 rnillion u.a. (tt.etl);
- 
for 2 4J1 contracfl (5I%), expenditure (t?4.9 million u.a.)
totalled the same as the nomi"nal amount.
The above figures for overspending and savings show that the total
net extra cost comes to 44 million u.a., which represents an
average increase of 6.1% over the nominal total for the contracts
(591 miffion u.a.). tfris result confirms the improvement during
the preceding financial year, the net extra cost having decl j-ned
from 10.04% in 1971 to 8.oV/" in l-972 and 6.7i in 1971.
Detailed examination of the net extra cost reveals that :
- supplementary expenditure resulting from price increases deriving
from price variation clauses came to 1!.1 million u.a., i.e. Z.b/o
of the nominaL amount of the contracts and 45.A/o of the total excess
expenditure;
- supplementary expenditure resulting from additional orders necessary
for proper execution of the projects or from technical snags arising
r,rhile the projects were in pro€rress amounted to 24.1 million u.a. ,
i.e. J.4% of the nominal amount of the contracts and 55. Ct'/o of the
total excess expendi ture.
These results are of interest for two reasons :
- First1y, they show that the efforts made by the Commission to
specify more precisely the conditions of execution of projects
are beginning to bear fruit : excess expenditure resulting from
technical snags declined from 7I% of total excess expenditure in
1972 to 55% in 1973;
- Secondly, they reflect the growing' impact of the increase in
pri-ces recorded over the last two years, the effects of which
will be particularly marked during 1974 and I9?5 z overspending
due to price increases rose fron 2fi of total- excess expenditure
in 1972 to 45% in 1971.
.LJ-
c) As in ).972, it appeared to be of interest to
down of the net extra cost according to the
of intervention. The situation is as follows
provide a break-
Fund I s main sectors
(in millions u.a.):
Sector No ofcont rac ts
0riginal
to taI(millions u. a. )
Overspending or
net cost
nrillions
u. a.
%
Urban construction
and other work
Road infrastructure
General infras truc tu-
re and industry
Crops and l ives to ck
Miscellaneous (1)
I
1
1
LZn
) t'+
arR
11')
a7r
188
17e
Lav
nR
11
2
2.9
].2.2
Y.o
1n
TOTAL 4 825 +.+
(l) lia for production, trade pronotiont etc.
Although there is evidence of a considerable improvement over the
preceding year, the net extra cost remains highest, as in the pastt
in the Ii-eld of infrastructure works.
It should be pointed out that the above examination was based on
cl-osed contracts on which work was in most cases begun some time
ago. rt is clear that the major cases of overspending have occurred
especially during the last two or three years. It follows that this
overspending does not figure in the statistics for concluded contracts
since it relates to projects which are mainly still in progress.
It is with thi"s in mind that the Comrnission has adopted measures to
minimize such effects on the financial conduct of the Fund.
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CTAPTER III 
- EFI'ECT OT' PRICE RISES ON PROJECTS IN PROGRESS
The study of overspending set out above shows how far the efforts
made by the cornmission have enabled the situation to be improved
during the last two years. It wou1d, however, be misleading to
draw over-hasty conclusions fron these results. Widespread
inflation and the increased cost of energyrwhich have made them-
selves felt much more rnarkedly since the end of l9?it have had the
effect of considerably swelling the cost of development projects
under way in the Associated States.
The information which the commission has been able to obtain has
indicated substantial rises in all sectors. For exarnple, by the
end of 1971 the cost per kilometre of asphalt road (in open counEryr
without constructive works or special obstacles) had risen by 24#
in Niger. In six months, the price of concrete-reinforci.ng steel
went up by 48% in Senegal , the cost of fuel doubled i.n Cameroon,
cenent went up by 1M in most States and the cost of African labour
by I(ft in one year and of expatriate l_abour by nearly J_!ff.
As indicated above, these increa'es are not yet reflected in the
statistical study on overspending carri.ed out by the commissi.on.
It is clear, however, that they witf have a serious effect on
projects in progress in lpl4 and L9?5 and that the encouraging
results recorded in 1972 and L9?j will not be repeated.
To minimize the adverse effect on the programming of community aid
for each stater the commission is ensuring that projects under way
are being carried out with the utmost economy. To achieve thisl
at every stage of execution, the Comrnission is dcubly keen to
find solutions which wilr involve the teast expenditure without
compromising proper execution of the projects (limiting studies and
technical assistance to what is strictly necessary, choosing the
technical solutions, selecting the contractors, additional works, etc)
Moreover, in so far as credit barances can sti11 be obtained despite
increased costs savings will not be used for providing aid not planned
originally. A11 spare funds with therefore normally be earrnarked.
either for covering overspending that wirr be inevitable on other
projects in the same country, or for financinpg priority projects stilr
on the prograflrme for the state in question and which might otherwisehave to be dropped.
In
of
22
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PART TWO
USE MADE OF COMPLETED PRO.'ECTS
L9?J tlte Community continued to seek information on the use made
projects financed by Communi-ty aid. A start was made by evaluating
completed projects in the various sectors covered.
A brief summary of the results of these projects was presented to
the Assoeiation council in the commission report on the management
of financial a1d technical cooperation in L973, which had been drawn
up pursuant to article 2.) of the second Yaound6 Convention. The
conclusions of these evafuations largely confirrned those drawn from
a previous examination of projects in the three sectors concerned.
They will not, therefore, be dealt with here.
At the same tirne the Commission embarked upon a compreh gnsive
evaluation of ll agricultural devel.oprnent schemes, the utilisation
of which has already been examined on various occasions over the
past few years.
This sector is particularly important for the development of most
of the associated countries, and it has always been one of the
main areas covered by financial and technical cooperation.
ApproximateLy 16% of financial commitment under the first tr-DF'
3?% under the second EDF and 3Cf/ of the funds commited up to
Jl Decernber 19?J from the resources of the third EDF were for
agricultural schemes. This tast percentage may well be considerably
reduced, however, since financing decisions have already been taken
on most of the agricultural projects coning under the third XDF.
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Financing decisions : situation at Jl December l-97J (nillion u.a.)
An analysis of the types of project financed in the agricultural
sector reveals a distinct change of emphasis from the first to the
third Fund. Hydro-agricultural schemes accounted for a large propor-
tion of the funds committed under the first llDF, whereas there were
relatively few projects involving industrj-a1 crops. However, under
the second EDF, the greatest number of commitments invoLving the
largest arnounts were for the f att,er type of project, whereas hydro-
agricultural schemes only accounted for roughly the same amount
as under the first Fund. The trend towards projects involving
industrial crops was further confirmed under the third EDF.
Breakdown of rural production pro.jects at Jl Decenber L971
tm].rr]-on u.4.,
To tal- de c is ions
of which:
rural produc ti"on
lst EDF 2nd EDf'
570.9
g+.1
7r7.7
265.9 (r)
537.7
roy.u
(1) lncluaj.ng 2l million u.a. for agricultural- price supporr
Total rural productlon
of which:
hydro-agricultural
schemes
industrial crops
lst EDF 2nd EDF Total
Y+
''I q
zo/
111
lRo
+4
_L lo
zoY
Most of the hydro-agricultural schemes financed from
were for Upper Vo1ta, Madagascar, MaIiy Mauritania,
and R6union. The nost irnportant projects carried out
of the countries listed have been evaluated and are
report.
the three lunds
Surinam, Burundi
in the first five
mentioned in this
-l.2-
Breakdown of industrial cro roiects at 1 December
\lLlIIlJ-9Il Lr.a.
Oi1 palm projects account for by far the greatest percentage of
commitments from the three Funds in the industrial crop sectort
followed by cotton- and tea-growing schemes, each accounting for
roughly 20% of total commitments. The large-scale project involvj-ng
palm plantations in Ivory Coast is deal-t with in this reoort. The
40r1 million u.a. reouired to finance it accounts for approximately
half of all commitments for oil palm nrojects from the first and
second Funds. The second largest commitment for industrial paln
plantations was allotted to Dahomey. The Mono palm plantations
project, which was financed under the first EDFr is analysed belowt
as is a project for the development of cotton growing in Sene61a1..
These few' figures show that very generally the projects dealt with
in this report can be ta<en as represen!ative of completed agricultural
orojects as a whole.
They are, however, less representative of agricultural devel.opnent
projects financed by the EDF as a whole, and in particular of the
most recent ones. Agricultural schemes take a long time to conplete
and a considerable period must elapse before their results can be
properly evaluated. Consequently, the completed projects deaft with
in this report bear the stamp of ideas which prevailed during the
early years of the EDF. Experience and knowledge gained in this field
since then have 1ed to developments in the methods of appraisal
and conception so that the projects examined reflect only a part
of the whole series of problems which are nor., raisedr and very often
solved when an agricultural project is drawn up. This should there-
fore be borne in mind when concfusi-ons are drawn fron this exanination.
Total industrial crops
of which :
oil palms
cotton
tea
lst EDF 2nd EDF To tal
't1
5
111
oz
_!'l
lZO
2'
:)*
zq
zo>
100
5i
2+
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One other reservation of a general nature needs to be made : the
long period of drought in the Sahel countries has had a noticable
effect on the use made of certain completed projects. As thj-s was an
externaL factor anii entlrely a matter of chance, ancl it lras not possible to
predict how long or how severe the drought would be, the detrirnental
effects have not been taken into consideration and are not even
mentioned in this repo rt.
Most of the agricultura] development projects which have been
eVafuated have seve-r1 rli f fona-+ +h^ugh usually complementary,
objectives.
A compara ti.ve analysis of the objectives reveals that operations
can be divided j.nto three groups according to the priorities of the
schemes:
schemes serving as
hydro-agricultural
pro duc t io n,
operations geared
and/or increase of
e tre<i e fnr" nl"ndrrr'i i rra i nrracfmonf
schemes plus improvement to conditions of
es : mefLer ni n1iov'i f rr l-n iha i rri7'^rlUCtiOnIJr jvr f vJ t
industrial c rops.
In the terms of the distinction made earlier on the statistical
breakdown of agricultural projects, the first two groups of operations
are, broadly speaking, rrhydro-agricuftural schemesrt and the third
group schemes lnvolving rrindustrial cropsrr.
3
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CHAPTER I - SCHEMES Si'RVING AS A BASTS FOR PRODUCTIVN INVESTMENT
Projects in this first group are nrainly to establish infrastructure
and carry out construction work vital for achieving other obiectivesr
for example improving the food situation in the countries concerned.
More particularly they are to establish the rudimentary infractructure
necessary to cope with various adverse constraints which could well
hold back economic development r without making any direct changes
in the production process itself.
Ultimately, the development of the Sahel countries deJ'ends on water
- for peop]e, for agriculture, for irrigation and for livestockt
migrant herds included. In these countries where water is of such
capital importance, pre-production schemes - to build damst to
enlarge pools for watering livestock - are of first priority and
seen as such by the Governments.
The idea behind pre-production schemes is not si-mply to provide
the populations with the requisi-te water, but also to preserve and
increase the value of another rare commodity, soi1. The evolution
of medical science, both human and veterinary, has brought in its
wake a vast increase in population and greater numbers of livestock.
The result is serious damap5e to plant life - grass I trees and
bushes - by man through tree-fe1lingr land-clearance and bush-fires
and by animals through overstocked pastures. The potent j-al of the
earth to provide food becomes even l-ower and more unreliabler soil
erosion is encouraged, and this contributes to the reduction of
enormous tracts of land to desert.
The nrimc aim of nroiccl-s in this f j r's! en-6.16 is to make ther lrL v]
necessary investments in water enEineering to supply both people
and livestock and to enable the ]and to be used in a more rational
waY.
1. Construction of rural dams
- 
iq 
-
/ 
-.\upper vorta /
The Government of Upper Volta was anxious to provide a solution to
the problems wlrich meagre and irregu}ar rainfall posed to its
population, livestock and agricLrlture and as early as 1950 decided
to make the construction of earth dams one of the mainstavs of its
investment policy.
This j.nterest in water supplies was the reason for the construction
between 1.960 and J-!66, of 40 darns financed by Community aid, in
three successive projects. (1)
?he first two projects were for the construction of 11 earth dams
to create permanent reservoirs which woufd guarantee a supply of
water for both population and Iivestock and for the irri-gation and
flooding of fields; tney woufd also enable pastures to be better
used and fish resources to be exploited. The first project, to
construct 29 earth dams, was motlvated by similar aims.
Most of the first 11 dams began to be used in 1962. Dams buiLt as
part of the third orojecr were first used in 1!64 and 1967 afLer
some delays because of technical changes in design. The initial
constructions were some\^rhat mdimentary and, on the basis of this
early experience, fan greater margins of safety were planned for l-ater
dams. These technical changes proved benefical although the resrrl-t
was thaf, Conmunity financing could only cover the construction of
2! dams instead of the 54 originally budgeted for.
The result of the work was considerable reserves of water to guarantee
the much-needed water s'rpply for both population and livestock. Most
of the reservoir.s were working properly in ]-977 when a check was
rnade on how they were being used. As a general rule the dans were
(l) tota:. expenditure : 9.Boo.ooO u.a.
1n
the
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a fairly satisfactory condition although r due to lack of fundst
authorities had been unable to carry out any real maintenance.
The population made very 1itt1e use of the pos6ibilities of irrigation
during the early years. Fish-breeding apart, very little agricultural
development took place in the areas served by the dams.
In 1966, with an eye to making greater capital from the dams r the
Government of Upper Volta carried out experiments to select more
suitable varieties of rice and to define the minimum agricul tural
standards. This led to the yield being doubled and in some ca.ses
quadrupled (4 tonsr/hectare of paddy rice). At the same time, efforts
to adapt traditional structures of rural. supervision resulted in
larger areas of land being put to use downstream from the dams.
The eventual outcome was an inprovement inresults, as seen in
higher yields and an increase in farmers t incomes.
with the same idea of increasing the effectiveness of investments t
the Comrnunity, at the beginni ng ot I9?4, undertook to provide funds
for improving and rnaking better use of plains, of an irrigable area
of 15o ha, downstream from existing dams. This operation, dealing
wi.th rice-growing and marshland, was an extremely important oner
as is emphasized by its inclusion in upper voltats second Development
a 1^-^ 11^-/yran ror r>/./ Lyto, in uhich 5oo ha of land downstrearn f rorn the dams
is scheduled for improvernent.
An analysis of the results of these projects reveals that the
construction of rural dams led to an irnprovement in water supplies.
This of course was their prime objective. Although, owing to a lack
of available funds, the Government was unable either to bring
about an immedj-ate improvement i.n the land downstrearn from the
dams or to intensj.fy production through rural training and information
measures, the value of such rural infrastructure works is nonetheless
clear. They are one of the means at the disposal of rural development
pol,idy and a condition of its success.
2. Hydro-agricultural schemgs i_4 the Brakna (Mauritania)
This project to control the supply of water was carried out in
Mauritania as part of a Government programne, in much the same way
as similar operations were carri.ed out i.n Upper Volta and Mali.
Five concrete dams were planned to i-ncrease the arnount of water
which could be retained after winter flooding so that milret growing
in the regj-on of the Brakna coul-d be extended and expanded and the
population could feed itself without the help of imports from
Senegal and Mali. Another aim was to encouraAe the nomads of the
region to. settle.
The work was completed (1) between 1!61 and l-953 and the five dams
were first used in 1951. They were faultless in desi.gn and were still
in good condition ten years later in spite of lack of maintenance
due to the fact that the authorities had insuffi.cient funds and that
the population, for its part, did not act since it was expecting the
State to do so. This lack of interest does not, generally speaking,
seem to derive f rorn conservatism or inertia on the part of the
population, but rather to a faj. lure on the part of the relevant
authorities to make the users aware of the problem or to provide them
with any follow up or support.
Ln l97L/I912 a survey was carried out on the use made of the five
dams. Three proved to be fu1ly operational; by increasing the water
available they were boosting the vital agricultural development of
the region. In two cases, however, the anticipated improvements did
not materialize. This was due to existing dams and to the ingrained.
ways of usin.g the land traditionally cultivated.
Although the theoretically cultivable land has not all been
improved, total production does exceed the amount needed to support
the population. The best results have been recorded for one of the
improved areas where fertilizers, fungicides and insecticides were
(1) total cost : ZJ4 ooo u.c.
71!l
The water points meant that the li.vestock was i-n betterrthough
still mediocre, condition. The phenomenon noticed in Upper Volta
was apparent there - nomads rstayed near the three dams which were
being put to use and either new settlements were founded or existing
villages, shops, school-s and dispensaries got bigger. Moreovert
standards of hygiene were raised by better water supplies. Lastlyt
the attitude of the population to the scheme was positive.
The concfusion is that the dams arebeing used satisfactorilyr at
least in years when there is sufficient rainfa1l. Howeverr the
choice of s ite for two of the dams is questionable and this could
weLl have been avoided by prior consultation with the people who
r^rere going to use it. The Commission now ensures that the local
population is integrated in the preparation of further proiects
nf t-hiq lvne sn fhei l'hprr havo ar interest in seeinp' it work andvrr r L, u.)
the proper functioning and the success of the scheme is thus
guaranteed.
Construction of dams in eastern Mauritania
When this project was drawn up, the accent was once again put on
rnaking the most of the rare sources of water in this sub-Sahara
region. The aim was to answer better the needs of the populationt
whose principal means of livelihood were the traditional agriculture
and s to ck-bree dinE.
The construction of ! darns and the fitting out of two sprrngs were
intbnded to make several areas of open country suitable for growi-ng
f nnrt 6rons (mi'llet) {n i.nnrnrr- }ho ngnflilions for vatering the
-L\Jvu Lr.v!'J \trrf rre!/ t ev rlryr
livestock and progressively to encourage the population to settle
around the resulting growth centres.
Work was begun in 1-967 and completed in 1969. It involved building
earth or concrete, or in one case pile/ plankr dams.
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The dams were checked in 1972 and found to be in only moderately
good order. Gis was because of certain technical faults which
developed d,rring building and which had thus far prevented final
acceptance; in farct the firm responsible was in compulsory
liouidatjon. Nevertheless, the dams and springs have already orovided
better water supplies for the inhabitants and the j.r livestock.
Stockbreeding has reaped. the greates benefit from the scheme.
As regards the effects of the scheme on the economyr of the l- 450 ha
which were to be make cultivable through flooding, approximately
1100 ha are in fact being worked. For lack of available funds, the
authorities have been unabfe to provide any supervision or training
and the farmers are sti1l usi-ng traditional methods without the aid
of fungicides, fertilizers, etc. This mcans that Lhe production
pobential of the dans 'i-s not being ful1y realised and that the yield.,
although greater than before the scheme was introduced, ig not un
to expectations.
It enrerges, however, that the nroject has contributed to the
creati.on of growth centres. The -settling process has :ln fact
resulted in the construction of se{ripernanent houses and vilIages.
Farminr conditions have been improved as regards food crops, althoueh
better results could have been obtained if some sort of rural
tral.ning or organizati-on had been instituted to better the pro.ject
integrate into its socio-econornic environment.
EnlarAement of 16 oools in Mali
The basic aim of this project was to improve the watering facilities
along the routes used fy migrant herd.s at the beginning and end of
the rainy season between the Macina and area into which the Niger
floods- and the Sahel. The project was to increase the depth of 16
existing pools by a maximum of 1.50 m (so as to remain in the layer
of clay) and both increase their capac j.ty and lenghten the
perlod during which they can retain rainwater.
-20-
The work (digging out a total volume of 70 OOO nJ of earLh, but with
no specia] improvements, like waterproofing, etc), for a total cost
of only lr35 OOO u.a. I was carried out between 1950 and 1951'
An inspection carried out on the spot in L97O, eight years after
the digging 1 sho',,red that twel.ve of the sixteen pools were in good
cond j-tion in spite of the almost total- lack of maintenance due to
the very limited funds avail-able. In June when the thunderstorms
begin, the pools fill sufficiently to retain water until the next
1ot of rain and the herds can return to the sahel in safety and
begi.n to use grazingtflrounds in this region at an earlier period.
In Novenber and December the herds are sure of finding water in
the deepened. pools and so on the way back they are able to spend
more time in the Sahel wai-ting for the withdrawa] of floodwaters
from the pastures in rhe Niger delca-
There is water in the poofs until January or February. How long it
stays is a question of evaporation and pernreability of the soil'
The project, on the who1e, has been successful. Relatively 1ittle
investment has brought about a considerable improvement in the
conditions surrounding the watering of cattle and this in turn has
led to the better health of migrant herds. Mention should also be
mzi.de of the secondary but not negligeable effect, which has been to
improve water supplies to the village populations. Both farmers and
villaEers show considerabl-e interest in this type of proiect'
5. Conc 1us io ns
\11 the pr^o jocts examined above haveled to
water supplies for the populations and
in stock-breeding conditions. This wast
meant to do.
a noticeabl"eimprovement in
for livestockt and to progress
above allr what theY were
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ft is however, useful to underline the socio-economic importance of
such projects. By increasing the availability of water - the limiting
factor of any economy - they encourage the agriculturaL deve}opment
of the regions affected, create poles of attraction at which the
nomads settle, and help to improve the health of the cattle and even
of the population. They enable downstream land to be rnore rationafly
worked if the necessary improvements are carried out rl' suitable
supervi.sion is instituted and 1f, in the longer term, everyday mainte-
nance of the dams is provides. The use made of the pro.jects in the
sur:vey was less satisfactory from other points of view I too few
land improvements were carried out and the working of cultivable l-and
was held back bY a lack of supervision and f ai l-ure to maintain the
dams,
Because of fack of available funds the relevant authorities weret
in fact, able to carry out hardly any maintenance on the dams and
pools. The only solution to these problems would seem to be an
addjtional effort over a long period to educate the recipient po5rulation
so that they themselves can undertake elementary maintenance at least.
This is wh.y more and more such schemes are being carried out through
,pubrlc works departments. This provides r"ro rk for the population and
is also likely to improve the conditions of maintenance by getting
the cooperation of the users.
As regards the proper exploitati.on of the downstream land r better
results could doubtless have been achieved by ensuring sufficient
supervision on the cultivable areas. In practice lack of funds meant
that no worthwhile supervision or rural training p!"ogramme was
possible. ft should be borne in mj.nd that i.n the early years of the
EDF this type of project was drawn up more or less in isolation and
the overriding aim was to provide the material investments needed
for water supplies. Providing the population with such facil"ities
was j.n itself supposed to encourage them to exploit the land and
t
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increase yie1d, the authorities of the recipient countries had
undertaken to provide the necessary fo11ow-up. But experience
proved that this idea did not really reflect reality. It became
apparent that some relatively inexpensive action alongside the
construction project could l-ead to investments in infrastructure
being distinctly more profitabJ-e. Projects of this type are now
designed to include not onJ.y pre-production improvements, but also
all the development of the cultivable land through supervisory and
advisory action which is put in the hands of local technical services
or nanagement firms. This is in fact the philosophy behj.nd the
second group of hydro 
-agri cultu ral schemes.
5. Hydro -agricul tural schemes in Nickerie and Tijgerkreek (Surinam)
Both tLrese projects can be classified with the first group, as
they aimed at providing infrastructure to control enough water to
increase Surinamrs cul-tivable land rather than at supplying water.
Both projects were part of the ten-year plan to continue the large-
scale creation of polders begun in 1949 for the purpose of supplyi.ng
the food vlhich the country needed, stepping up exports of agricultural
products and j"ncreasing the number of jobs available. The amount of
cultivable land at the disposal of the large and rapidly expanding
rural population was to be increased. Reclaimed land could be given
to snallholders so the dri.f t to the towns, where there has insufficient
employment, would be curbed..
The hydro 
-agri cu l tural schemes in the Nickerie district vere
intended to provide an infrastructure of canals and roads for a total
area of 14 ooo ha (1o ooo ha in existence and 4 ooo ha planned)
including the technical and socio-econonic studies for the plan to
develop the 4 O00 ha and for the purpose of ensuring that water vras
more econonically used. The orops in question were ri.ce and bananas.
Conmunity financing of I 988 OOO u.a. covered the studies for the
project and the work itsel-f , and to this was a.dd.ecl Netherlanii-s airl. of
J OOZ Ut U U.a.
_ .)^ _
The work at Tijgerkreek West was part of the land reclaiming
programme in the Nickerie district, which was due to be completed
in 1967. The project was to provide canals and roads for a total
area of 10!0 ha and roads for a further I9O ha. The crops in question
were ricb and vegetables. The EDF and the Netherlands Governrnent were
joint financers of the operation, which included preparatory studies
and supervising the workl each was responsj-b1e for roughly half of
the cost (nOf : 44, OO0 u.a,, Netherlands ard, ; J22 00O u.a.). Worx
was completed at the end of 197f.
The achievements of the two pro.jects are typical, of agricul-ture j"n
Suri.nam 
- on the one hand large farms exploiting nearly jPl of the
cultivated land, and on the other hand, independent sma1lho1cli.ngs.
Thus more than half of the 4 00O tra of reclaimecl land. was to be
attributed to smal-lholders in ntots of 5 to 9 ha. By the beginning
of I974 most of the reclaimed land had been attributed.
From a Iega1 point of view, the land has been provisionally
attributed for between 3 and 5 years until rdpayments on the land
have been made and the plots developed. Thereafter, land wifl be
a t tri bu ted on l-onf leases.
The Ministry of Agri.culture has accepted fuIl responsibil_ity for the
agricultural development and upkeep of the land. Its own officials
on the spot will carry out agricultural- research and elperiments etc.
A model farm has been set up in the area and an experimental- station
has tested a i^ride variety of vegetables. A special department is
responsible for the water network and its upkeep. This has not always
worked satisfactorily because the bank loans to be providd for the
purchase of equipment were insufficient.
Enough detail-s on the way in which these two schemes are working are
not yet available for a full appreciation of their effect on the
economy. The results do, however, seen most pronising and have already
brought about a rise in the farmerts standanl of living. The new imi.ga.tion
network has meant that two rice crops instead of one can now be grown.
Both the studies and the work i-tself have led to better irriEation and
control of water on the whole 14 O0O ha of nolder.
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CI]APTUR 1I . HYDRO-ACRICULTURAL SCI{N4I]S PLUS IMPROVtr}4ENT TO THE
cgIpITIoNS 0F PRODUCTT0N
The projects of this second group of investments have two aims :
to carry out improvements to agricultural infrastructure, and thus to
create, in a given area, the best conditions for agricultural prodlrc-
tion. Unlj.ke the schemes of the first group, it is no longer merely
a case of ensuring water supplies I but rather of controlling the
water and systematically improving and intensifying production.
Consequently, these projects complement and involve making the logical
improvernents to the basic development work; they consist of a main
scheme (hydro-agricultural devel-opment), supplemented by a seri-es
of concurrent or subsequent additional schemes for rnodernizing the
area on rational- lines (1and reformsr extension service6, generating
interest and involvernent, providing advisory and supervisory stafft
setting upa managenent body, marketing, etc).
1l{ dro-aericultural development of the Anon delta (Madagas car)
This project arose from the proSramne for the socio-economic develop-
ment of the whole of the Lake Alaotra basin, which had the follovring
aims : hydro-agricultural development I development of cropst princi-
pa1ly rice, particularly :
- 
improving growing conditions in 5 0OO ha of rice fields already
under cultivation, of which only 10OO ha were regularly irrigated;
- reclaimin1 I 610 ha of new land;
- 
extending the rice-fields on to 1600 ha of marshland.
The cuftivated areas were to total 7 25O ha.
The project was desipqned to include :
- 
an attempt to increase each familyrs cash incomel
- land reform (consolidation of holdings) ensuring a relatively
egalitarian distribution of land to provide farms of 4 io 5 ha on
ave rag e ;
- 
the choice of a system of lndividual ownership, with title-deeds being
issued after fifteen years;
- 
diversification of crops, especially by introducting out-of-season
crops;
- 
modernization of the new farms ( equiprnent, savj.ngs schemes);
- 
systemati-c repayment by the owner of the total costs of development
schemes, consolidation of holding trainifrg and.'supervision, and other
services provided, except for infrastructure costs.
- 
1,2 -
The EDF bore the main part of the capital expenditure on infrastructure.
The new charges (public works, extension servj.ces, national i_nsurance..)
borne by the Malagasy authorities r trere to be covered by introducing
a tax ,on wat e r.
The total cost of the project, which was carried out between 1958 and
1!/O, amounted to 4.33 nittion u.a. (1); i.e. 59? u.a./ha for the
7 25O ha developed. The institutional framework for imp)-ementing the
project was provi.ded by SOMALAC (2).
The resuf ts of this nFn i or.f nrqrr l.ro ^^nsidered aS a success f or the
following reasons:
- Consolidation of holdings was carried out as initi,ally planned;
more than 1 JOO standard 4 to 5 ha farms being set up in l!68 in
fhp Arnnrr ar.aa.
- After completing the hydro-agricultural schemes in the area it was
possible to implement the overall programnein I97A;
- The operating costs for the area are being met by local departments
and the farmers themselves. ft should, however, be notedp that
contrary to the initial concept, the recurrent charges involved in
maintaining the water supply schemes are not covered by a water tax
i-mposed on the users, who themselves maintain the quaterna.rlr network I
- 
The socio-economic advancement of the farmers, on an individual and
collective 1evel, appears to be working we1l. The aims set as regards
equipping the farns have been virtual.Iy achieved in four years.
There has been a remarkable development of collective equipment(tractors, treshing machines, etc) thanks to the rural associations
grouping together the owners, which receive contributions from their
members and loans granted by the National Bank.
The internal econonic profitability of the project has risen to a
very high 1eve1, the net profit per ha having quadrupled compared
with the situation prior to the scheme (J). fnere is no doubt either
of the economic profitability at national 1eve1, the capital-output
ratio being about 4.5 (4).
tr \ ^ ^-^ ^^^\I) 2 7r9 0O0 u.a. (financed by
r'lo uuu u.a. \rlnanced oy
coop6ration)
.../...
the lst and 2nd EDF)
FAC 
- 
Fonds frangais draide et de
] f92 000 u.a. (sOMALAC contribution)4 ]27 00o u.a.(2) soci6t6 Malgache drAm6nagement du Lac Alaotra (Malagasy company for
developing Lake Alaotra) a mixed-investment company created in I)SI(l) FMG 8 too prior,to scheme being carried out (for a production of
L.6 t/ha of paddy
T'l"lG 72 45O after completion of scheme (for a production of ).4 t/ha)(4) for an investment of WIG I 12? OOO the additional value of
productj-on when fu1ly operating is of the order of llO million
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Finally, a review of the effects of the project reveals the
following points :
- 
The accent was put on technically nrodernizing the means and
nethods required to develop a traditional food crop (rice) suited
to the locaI region; the project therefore avoided running the
risks inherent in innovation and the uncertainties occurring with
industrial crops or with populations which might migrate.
- 0n that basis of modern farming comnunity was created, the members
of which own individually reasonably-sj.zed farms enabling them to
earn large cash income. llowever, the si-ze of the f arrns and the
possible yields are such that the ovlners are even led to make use
of paid Labour. In theory, the family working units available on
the farms should be able to carry out all the farming operations
without recourse to ouuside fabour. In actual- fact, in this region
a rniddle class of owner-farmers is being created who are clearly
better off than the average members of the Malagasy farming conrnunity.
Their cash income, which is large compared with the re6gional averaget
enabl-es them not only to overcome the hurdle of running into debt
but also to set up a savings fund. However, the question nay well
be asked whether individual savings are not partially diverted into
covering the cost of paid labour, which on certain farms accounted
for rnore than a third of the total working tirne. It rould be
concluded that the size of the holdings has been made too 1arge.
0n the other hanC, given the coll-ective equipment available this
is certainly not the case.
- 
T)esn i to fhoqo ni r nrrrnc+arnoc
success is that it is being
the benefit of the holdings
the creation of a colony is
one of the reasons for the operationrs
carried out in the region itself for
there so that ne j.ther migratlon nor
involved.
- Ef f ic j,ency and coherence in concei.vinp5 equiping and supervising
the scheme vere made po$sib1e by very thorough going preliminary
studies and the coherence of the overall p1an, which was followed
very closely. The standard of SOMALACTs managerial staff and the
loreiEn advi s e rs rvas excellent.
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Finallyr it should be emphasized that the capital outlay on the
area was moderate z 597 u.a. per hectare.
Al1 things considered, the pro ject's results are quite rernarkabf e as
regards both production, where the anticipated changes have in fact
been made and the integration of the project within the economy and
society of the country. Wel-l thought out coherent and adapted to the
locaf situation, the project has generated undeniable social and
economic change right across the popula.tion spectrum involved.
2. I{ydro 
-e€li cultural 4rvelelrngnt of the So4vina qlea (Madagascar)
The oroject (1) consisted in the hydro-agriculturaf development of the
Saovina area in Fianarantsoa province, which is a va11ey where the
traditional occupat j-on is rice growing, and the rate of nopulation
increase (l%) is above the national average. 0n the basis of a fairly
simple infractructure (irrigration network, dam, water channels) the
nroiecl. invnlved thc develonnent of I066 ha in order to :
- 
increase rice production from I.5 t/ha to J t/ha;
- create a sma11 locaI marketing flow;
- 
increase the populationrs income.
An addi"t j.onaI scheme, carr1ed out by the Centrale d'6quipement agricole
et de modernisati-on du paysannat (CEAMP), was designed to :
- bring about consoliCation of holdings (facilitaded by the limited
number of farmers in the area) and by using the newly-prepared land,
increase the average size of each holding from t ha to 2 ot t ha
rlonarrrli n- nr ai nnrrncf avrnac.
vu"ru vqlvvv t
- 
provide supervisory staff and advisers for the benef icJ-ary populationt
enabling yields and productivity to be increased by means of improved
techniques (selected seeds, manuring, etc).
The techniques used in creating the areas infrastructure were similar
to the traditional systemr which gave the farmers a real interest in
the project, and the work of managing and maintaining the network of
earth drains, carried out by the farmers themselves, is facilitated
as a resuLt.
(1) cost of the
provided by
project : 575 O00 u.a.t
the EDtr' and 59 OOO u.a.
of which 516 OoO u.a. was
by the Malagasy Gove rnment
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The results of the project are such that it may be considered a
success, and virtually all its aims have been achieved. The economic
profitability of the project is undeniable : the net income per
hectare has more than doubled (1). The econonic profitability at
national level also underscores the projectrs importance, the
capital-output ratio being 4.1 (2). Tfre effects that the project has
had on production are ref .l.ected in the start of a loca1 marketing
ffow resulting in increased income and 
- owing to redistribution
thereof 
- 
an improvement in living conditions.
An analysis of the results obtained shows that the success is pri-
parly attributable to the exce1l.ent way in which the project was
thought out, provicling for well .integrated implementation at both
operational and sociological leve1. Not only did this avoid upsetting
bhe usual way of life but it provided all the means necessary for
effectively modernizing the farming conmunity, and it was endeavoured
to ensure that the beneficiary population would participate from the
start. Participation was welcomed by the Betsileo, who are highly
proficient in growing rice by traditional methods and willing to
organize thernsel-ves where the scheme is carried out progressively
in the context of the family holding and relates to a traditional
crop (rice). .fhus the farmers unclertook to take part in tertiary
development work (digging channels, bui.lding bunds) and maintenance
work ( clearing of channels).
Development of the infrastructures through CEAMPT s combined schemes
accomodated a1I asoects of the farmersr points of concernq without
however estabf ishinrr a burdensome and constricting supervisory
system. Accordingly, the reallocation of land was carried out with
respect for local traditions, during public discussions, and with
the participation of the people concerned. The time taken up by
this procedure was largely made up afterwards.
(1) Before development : FMG 19 OOA/ha (based on
less the
After development : FMG 17 OOO/ha up to 1968
rMG 49 zjo/ha after 1968(e) totat capital outlay : FMG 165 mi1lionl value(when fully operational): I14 G 40 million
.../ ...
t. J v. vJ. yaL.uJ
cost of seeds )( 3 t/ha)( 4 t/]na)
af rrn,4'ra+i 
^-
The supervision is both f.igbt and effioientl advice and information have
been provided not only on rice growing but also on other lines of
production (orchards, dry crops, etc.), and the marketing cooperative
has been assisted.
As regards the future forecasts for improving yields and incomes are
excellent, owing in particular to the use of new methods, the
generalization of animal-drawn tillage and the implementation by the
Malagasy authorities of additional capital projects.
Hydro-agricuftural development of Bas-Mangoky (Madagascar)
The aim of the project was to develop an area within the tsas-
Mangoky de1ta, which has considerable agricultural potential provided
it is irrigated. The development of this region was intended to
attract immigrants 
- 
which would relieve congestion in the over-
populated areas of the country 
- 
and to create a growth point bene-
fiting the peoples of the South - a particularly underdeveloped regj.on.
In view of the ecological conditions, it was planned to use the new
arable land for growing cotton and rice. The first experi.ments had
already been carried out on a pilot unit of l OOO ha established
between 1961 and 1p6l and financed by FAC.
A first instalment costing 4.8 million u.a., financed fron the first
EDF, and carried out between 1954 and 1955, comprised an intake
structure on the Mangoky river, a 20-km canal for conveying water
to the area anda 16-krn main irrigation channel (including a protective
dike) to serve an area of approximately 10 OO0 ha.
In 1966 the work comprising the second instal.ment was bep'rrn,
involving preparation of the agricultural areas and costing !.7
mill-ion u.a. payabLe out of the second EDF. It was planned to prepare
3 75O heclares under this instalment.
As regards finance, the EDF, with its total commitment of 14.6
million u.a. (including technical assistance), has supplemented the
contribution of the Malagasy Governement t which has provided part
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of the capital of SAMANGOKY (1) and covered attendant expenditure
on roads and on social , medical , educational and administrative
facili.ties.
It should first of all be pointecl out that Ln l-969 and 1970 the area
was struck by two cyclones, which did great damage to the water
intake installations and embankments, and flooded mroh of the aglicultural
area. Consequently, the Commission decided to reallocate a portion
of the funds committed for the second instalment in order to finance
measures for protecti-ng the area, with the result that the area
under cultivation has remai.ned limited to about 2 5O0 ha.
The nroject is based on a form of rrassociatj.onrt where the workr costs
and income are shaved between SAI'ANGOKY and the rrassociatedrr farmers.
SAMAMOKY is responsible for the technical and administrative
management of the area, that part of the farming work which can
be carried out by mechanical mean-s and various goods and servicesr
involved in production, such as waLer, mechanical. ploughing,
soraying insecticides and herbicides by aircraft, technical super-
vision, etc. The farmer, who does not own land but holds rights
of user, only carries out manua1 tasks involved in part of the
fiefd work in accordance with general conditions and a timetable
laid down by SAMANGOKY. He is closely supervised by the rnanagement,
staff of SAMANGOKY and works a nlot. The location of this varies
accordinp to the crop rotation req'rirements and its size is governed
by the ren:irement to obtain the highest possible productivity
from the land available.
In order to cover al-l its costs. SAMANGOKY takes half the cotton
cro-o, the other half beina bought at a unit price of fMG 4O/Ug ot
cotbon seed (1923).It also takes half the rice crop, the other half
beinp' left to the farmers. The farnerr s income therefore depends
partly on the yield and partly on the plot which he is aUotted.
(t) Sor.i6l6 norrr 'l tA'n6nap'encnl. et 1a Mise en valeur de 1a Va116'e du
Bas-Mangoky
- 
nl 
-
Since demand has always largely exceeded the plots avaj.lable, however,
SAMANGOKY has been conrpelled over the years to reduce the s j.ze of the
plots, particularly as the cultivable area has been extended at a
slower rate than forecast because of the damage caused by the cyclones.
The production results obtained in the at€a may be cons id.ered satisfactoryl r
the yield having far exceeded the forecasts (1).
The conception of this project raises a few problems of principle. rts
aim was twofold : firstly, the regional objective of developing a
virgin arear very sparsely populated and prepared in order to attract
immigrants from the South and, secondly, the val.ue of an increase in
cotton production for the national economy. The choice of the site wa.s
governed by considerations of reflional developnent and raised virtuarly
no land problems. On the other hand, opting for an area where the
production fector in shortest supply wcs l.abour has provecl an awkwanC.
solution, for most of the associates arriving in the area are not
true farmers, and i-t is they who are entrustecl with the cultivation
of cottont which requires ri6gorous discipline and perfect execrrtion
of every aspect of field work at the appropriate time. They are givcn
certain responsibilities as a result of the sharing of work with
SAMANOOKY. fn such a system, which is perforce intensive, any
shortcoming involves consequences r*hich are much more serious than
in a traditional set-up.
It i.s questionable whether the farmers are sufficiently interested
in a venture where they are neither owners nor wage earners.
Cut-off from their traditional environment, they move from one cotton
plot to the next. ff, however, the associate fail-s to carry out the
essential field work at the appropriate time, SAMANGOKy is conpelred
to intervene and put paid labour to work on the plots of the defaulting
farmers, the cost of this l.abour being charged to those concerned.
(f) ffre average cotton yield for the period 1950 to 1921 was 2.6
of cotton grainl in certain years production even reached JIn the future it is hoped to achieve an average yield of 2.8
which would be among the best in the world. Rice production,
on a single crop per year, was 1.1 t/ha for the period 1!50
t/ha
t/ha.
1^^-^.l
Lo L97a
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The consequences are, howeverr more serious for SAMANGOKY than for
the farmer who can escape attention and produce traditional crops
outside the area or, if he is too heavily in debt, may leave the
area overnight. There is in fact a migration problem : the peoples
of the South come to the area in the first instance to earn money
with which they can buy cattle after a few years and return to the
region they came frorn. When they have ex[austed their savings they
come back to the area. However, as the years Fo bXr their average
stay in the a.rea,gets longer and they return less frequently to their
regions of origin. Since this trend shows that the emigrants are
becoming interested in a prolonged stayt it would seem that a system
consistin6l entirely of wage earners in an industrial plantation is
not necessarily the best solution, even though financially more
advantaseous to SAMANGOKY thanks to the higher productivity of the
labour force. It appears difficult, however, to uge a wage-earning
system for rice growing. Taking into account the aim of developing a
poor region, it is moreover questionable whether the system of
rrallocatingtr land on the basis of rights of user is srrf f iciently
attractive and gives the farmers enough sense of responsibility to
induce them to settle in the area for Eood.
Tackling the question of a,llotting the land of the farmers as their
prlvate property necessarily involves raising that of the cost of
the infrastructure and of preparing the area. However, the development
structures have been conceived on practical and modern 1ines, taking
account of the possibility of future expansion, and from the
technical standpoint alone they may be considered as a model for
large-scaJ-e irrigated schemes. Now that the arears protective
structures have been reinforced against heavy f 1,ooding, such as
that caused by the cyclones which submerged the project, they may
be considered as proviCi_:- an adequate safety margin. Since the
quality of the soil in the catchnent area is steadily deteriorating
and it is not possible to know the flow pattern of the Mangoky river,
the result is an average cost per hectare for the project.
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which weights heavi.ly on any calculation of profitability and it
would be difficult for owners to bear even part of such coasts.
It shoul-d also be noted that the SAMANGOKy t s headquarters are at
Tananarive t which is too far from the project, and bad communications
further aggravate the situation. This problem is closely li.nked with
the general question of the force of attraction exercised on the
management staff by the town, which in the long run ri.sks hampering
very seriously the balanced and harmonious development of the areas
concerned.
In any event the political and economic interest of the project
seems undeniable r given the possibilities for expansion and regional
development, employment anc production. Basic developnent havj"ng been
carried out, and in order to increase the total area sufficiently
for SAMANGoKY to be self-fj-nancing, the commission took a financing
decision in 1973 to extend the area to cover J OOO ha of new
agricultural land and thereby increase the useful agricultural area
from the present 2 lO0 ha to 5 5OO ha.
4. Developlnent of three rice-growing areas in Mali
The purpose of this project was the hydro-agricultural development
of three areas aimed at controlling the water required for growing
rice and other food crops (sorghurn) 1oca1ly by digging channels and
building structures for regulate inflow and outflow. The building of
protective dikes and certain additional roadworks were designed to
extend, itensify and regularize the crops in question and this is
of vital- importance to a dense population which is sometimes under-
employed and handicapped by its inability to control very difficult
irrigation conditions without help.
a t.
The project consisted in the development of the following areas :
- 
Mopti-Sud plain : creation of a rice-growing area of 4lOO hat
- 
Sarantomo-Sine plain: launching rice cultivation on 5 8OO hat
- 
Koboro marsh : l-aunching cultivation of sorghum on land irrigated
with f -Lood water andof rice on flooded 1and, over an rea of 2 ooo ha.
The schemes were carried out in 1964 and 1965 (1), partly by firms and
partly by public work.s departments, and with the help of the locaf
popuLation in the case of the Koboro narsh'
An examination of the a the prepared land is being used shows that
the resrrlts of the project are very satisfactory. The land is in good
shape except at Sarantomo, where considerable damage was done to the
area by the lliger floods in t967/68,
The Koboro scheme has special features, sj-nce it was designed to
cater for the cultivation of sorghum on land irrigated with flood
water. In a poor and very densely populated area it was important
not only to control the floorl water but alsc to extend the available
land. The schene in Mopti-Sud was al.ready fully operating in 1958 -
five years after conpletion of the work - and the resufts are
carticul-ar1y goorl (2). it Sarantomo, however, the launch was
delayed owing to inefficiency on the part of the national technical
departrnents as regards bush-cl-earing and land prenaration prior to
development - work not covered by ED!" financing' Tbe situation was
further aggravatecl by the damage caused by the Niger floods' The
anticipated results have not therefore been fu11y achieved'
An analysis of the results shows that the satisfactory ones are
attributable to the fact that the benef ici.ary farmers were al.re:idy
conversant with the irrigation technique and the crop selected. working
on the basis of this knowledge, the scheme was aimed at controlling
thervaterandextendingthecultivablelandandatintensifying
cul-tivation of it by modernizing the techniques whife at the same
tirne retaining the structure of traditional- vi11age-based production.
(1) Total(e) rrre t+
among
cost
8co
5oo
: 1.9 milfion u. a.
ha of prepared land I
farmers I yields ros e
1aO ha more than Planned\was shared
from o.6 t/ha to L.5 t/ha in 1968/59
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The nonr:'l ati on I s .att j tUde toWard thiS tvne nf nr"n'ieni i s vcr.' nosi ti vevrrfUuJy!vafrvJUU!,yv.ruavL
which is one of the main reasons for its success. But it should also
be emohasized that the farmerst v::1. lirrnr"= to adopt anct apply imoroved
farning techniques is aopreciably enhanced by national supervisory
ql:ff whnca ahil i +'
- 
_,f 1s proven.
The three rice growing schemes are a first step towards broadening
the scope of this type of food crop project to cover nore complex
arrangements. The purpose of these schemes is to increase food crop
production in order to meet regional or national dernand. Tn the last
few years the EDF has financed a number of nrojecrs of this type in
I'1a1i, Niger, Mauritania and Senegal. From experience gained on
hydro-agricultural schenes financed previously, the Conmissjon h;rs
progressively perfe6ted its approach, particularly as regards
supervision, for the quality of supervis j"on and extension work can
largely determine the effectiveness of such projects. (1)
In I'1a1i the EDFrs efforts were combined with commitments by the
Government, which in 1959 launched an initial scheme for superv rsi.ng
rj-ce growers in the S6gou and l'1opti regions, hrhich enabled the
conditions for supervision of rice growing under controlled flooding
to be tested. 0n the basis of the experi-ence gained there were
conceived a project for developing rice 6rowing in the 56gou region,
financed by the EDF, and a similar project in Mopti currently
being carried out with IDA financing.
l. Conclus ions
An examination of the
schemes ln l'{adagascar
been a success for the
results obtained from the
shows that the Anony and
following reasons :
hydro-agricultural
Soavina projects hav e
\r/ see unaprer rv
ar
-)o-
- the planning was thorough going; extremely conprehensive
preliminary studies (in the case of Anony) made for coherent and
well-integrated imPlement a t ion;
- while arlhering to the principle of private property, the schemes
were carried out in the context of the traditional family holdi-ng;
- the mod.ernization of production techniques is designed to be carried
out progressively ancl is initially based on traditional crops (rice)
and existing facilities and methodsl
- the improvements in production methods have avoided upsetting the
tradi tional wav of lifei
- 
the strpervisory staff had to deal r^rith a population which was very
receptive to the technical ideas proposed, wh j-ch no doubt reinforced
i+c offi 
- 
i anav.r !v 4 elvJ' t
- narticipation by the population was ensured from the start of the
scheme (Soavlna);
- 
the size of the new plots has enabl ed them to be farmed very
systematically; the increase in cash income has even led to the use
of paid fabour in the case of AnonY.
Broadly speaking, the same reasons hold good for the proiect in |r!ali,
where the improvement and modernization of farming techniques were
based mainly on the traclitional, vitfage-based production structure.
The improvements brou8ht about by the hydro-agricultural schemes
(water control) and by the pr"ovision of intensive and ef f ic j.ent
srrpervision ;:re i,n connection with food cropsr in which the population
has always displayed a run interestr
However, the Bas-l,langoky nroject in Madagascar raises a number of
problerns:
- 
the cost of regional cievel.opment of a virgin area to relieve the
overpopulated southern regions has been high. The capital outlay
on the project however, is such as to pernit enlargement of the
holdings - both in the future and already under way - and
subsequently crossing the economic profitability thresholtl;
- on the other hand, this project emphasizes the fact that immediately
assessable economic profitability cannot be the only criterion for
decisions regarding agricultural deveLopment schemesl other factors
rnustbe taken into account1 such as eciucation, transformation of the
environment, trainingr e tc.
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this project in a very sparsely populated area raised virtually
no land problemsl however, only some of the immigrants f rorn the
South decided to settle;
the farmers coning to the area as wage earners were in general not
famili.ar wi.th cotton growing, but thanks to intensive supervision
they were able to adapt rapidly to the manual tasks they were given.
On the other hand, the system chosen - that of association(allocation of plots) - has its weaknesses; it fails to generate
a big enough sense of responsibility in the farmers, with the resul-t
that the productivity of the scheme malr be adversely affected.
The following two projects are somewhat similar to the second group
of schemes, though they have different features. What is involved
here is the development of areas without preliminary hydro-agricultLtral
preparation. In Upper Volta, where the area in question has already
been the subject of antl-erosion measures, the project is limited
to developing the potential of the area by financin. technical.
assistance. In Rwanda, road and social infrastructuresare being
developed concurrently with and subsequent tot the setting up of
farming communities. Generally speakingt these projects are covered
only by the second part of the schemes of the second grouot as basic
preparation has already taken pJ-ace (Upper Volta) or is not required
because it is planned to grow dry crops (coffee in Rwanda).
6. Developmejrt of the Yatenga regi.on (Upper Volta)
On the basis of anti-erosion measures undertaken previously in
Yatenga, community aid was provided to finance a technical assistance
projectl involving the provision of supervi-sory and advisory services
by a regional devel-opnrent body in accordance with Upper Volta policy.
The scherne, which started in
- establishing the regiona 1
ORD ( Orp5anisme 16gional de
March 1965 (1)t was mainly concerned with:
structure and trainine the staff of the
d6veloppement),
| | I rl'^ii I 
^^ct
Upper Volta
1.5 mi.tlion u.a. of whj- ch 57% was financed by
_ 1f, _
improving productivity by the dissemination of si.mple cultivation
methods, which could be assimilated easily by the farmers and
involved the use of fungicides, fertilizers, selected seeds and
animal-drawn tillage.
This scheme was completed in 1970r with technicaf assistance f ronn a
team of five financed out of EDF resources. It 
"ras 
divided into three
stages:
- 
provision of supervisory and advisory staff for an area approximating
to the administrative district of Ouahigouya (t965-L967)i
- 
establishment of the Yatenga ORIJ and extension of advisory services
to the whole of the Yatenga region (I96f -ry68);
- continuation of assistance to the ORD and a reduction in the size of
the technical assistance staff (\968-I97o).
Followi ng the Decree seLting up the Yatenga ORDr the body becrme
operational in 196?. The oRDts institutional structure I which grouped
fnoar-1.rav frrrarin-. 
^'"orri nrr<l rr nerf ormprl Lrv nnn-e-oord'i n3f a,'l denart.-cntsL\J6sL.rvl rurru -.LUrr.r l-,r s I r\rr.r-rJ PErrvrtit!u vJ
ancl was capable of incorporating other actj-vities, has proved to be
well-conceived. The ORD has become a valuable instrumenl \^Ihich has
c".von qnnlo nrno'of iis cf ieiencv in the rural development of the
region. As far as technical assistance was concerned, the aim was to
reolace exoatriates by Upper Volta staff. This was accomplished -
even ahead of schedrrle j-n certain cases. The Upper Vol-ta arrthorities
assignetl staff of excellent quality, to the ORDr. and the nunber of
basic supervisory staff was greater than anticipated.
The advisory services provided by the supervisory staff offered
in progressive order and aimed in particular at
crop yields. It would seem that the various topics
were very well- received by the farmers concerned.
the systematic introduction oI improved farming
reflected in a 20% increase in production for mil-let
and sorghurn, 26:4 f or grounclnuts and g}g6 f or sesame between 1967 and
1969. The result would no doubt have been even better had the
rainfa.ll been normal or a.t least sufficient. Animal-drawn tillage
was adopted in many cases.
topics arrange d
increasing foo d
and te ch ni o'.res
The effects of
l-anhni 
^rraq :ra
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There is no doubt about the useful,ness and the efflciency of the
project : carried out in a specific rep'ion and based on an established
infrastructure which was not modified. ftls EDF operation contributed
to the creation of better conditions for increasing production.
Efficient technical. assistance and the supervisory staff provided
by the ORD made a major contributionr which was weII thought out and
well executed, to the effort undertaken by Upper Volta to rnake the
greatest possible use of the land available and to improve the
conditions for the rural deve'l opment of the Ye teng a re gi on.
Accordingly, the Community decided in 1970 to f j"nance a three-year
extension of the technical assistance, involving intensification of
the advisory services provided by the ORD and certain additjonal
work aimed at further developnent of completed projects in the
Yatenga region.
communities in the MavaRa-Bugesera region of Rwanda
This project, involving the establishment of farming comr:unities t
fits into the context of the countryts general ajms of lelievin6J
conp5estion in the overpopulated areas and ofstepping un and
diversifying agricultr.rral production (export crops, food cropst
stock-6rss6ins).
The project, nart of phased overall. plan to develop Mayaga-Bugesera t
provided for settfing 12 ooo families in ten areas (l-) using a modern
and rational anproach. The EDF scheme was maj n1y concerned with
establishing and developing the farming communities, but also involved
studies and research, the development of road. infrastructLlre r an
anti-tsetse fIy campaign and improvement of the social infrastnrcture.
The farming community is the keystone of the programme : the
peasant families have been settled on plots covering two hectarest
systematically laid out Ieaving sufficient room for graz'ing and
afforestat ion.
(1) Three other areas
P-'l 
-i a- qi rtue f 6 rqra q!s
had already been developed by means of
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The peasants are given gelp vrith settling in and planting coffee
and are expected to keep to a given programme in developing their
p1ot. The farming techniques applied are designed to increase and
improve the production of coffee and to intensify food crop production.
The different forms of assistance are coordinated bv the Office du
Bugesera-Mayaga (OBM ) .
Much of the cost of providing supervisory staff, both expatriate
and localr was covered by the EDF. fn principle, this staff has
the task, during the phase of setting up the farming communities,
of stocki.ng the plots and coffee plantations, settlingg in the
farmers and setti.ng up cooperatives and, during the intensification
phase, of sunplementing and supervising work carried out under the
programne, and organizing agri cultural credit and the operation of
the cooperatives and the marketing system.
Execrrtion of the project vas phased between 1959 and 1973 (l).
Technical assistance will remain on the spot until I975/f9?5.
The results and effects of all the projects were examined in 19?2.
This revealed that, in all, approximately 1J 0OO plots had been
prepared and nearly 14 O00 families settled in the areas financed
by the EDF. The fLor^r of r'nigrants exceeded forecasts. Much of what
has been achieved is attributable to the supervision, which was
more intensive than initi,ally forecast and is in much greater evidence
in the farming communities than elsewhere. The methods of supervision
used initially 
- based on a few farmers chosen from among the most
progressive 
- 
were not imi"tated as had been anticipated. T,ater on,
greater success was achieved by adopting the system of rural
trai.ning which was aimed at all the peasants and took the form of
demonstrations or regular contacts to encourage the use of certain
techniques.
(1) Total expendi ture
/.o mr" _t l_ ron u.a.
for the whole of the Mayaga-Bugesera programme:
of which 75% was provided by the EDF
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The special addi tional aims have mainly been met, particularly the
sttrdies and research and the anti-tsetse fly campaign in the Bugesera
region. The efforts made in respect of the social and economic
infrastructure (schools, dispensaries, sheds, warehouses t pest control,
etc.) have given the farming community much more equipment than is
rrsrra l in fhis tvne 9f enVironment.
An examination of the use made of the project shows an appreciable
improvement in the standard of living of the population settled in
the farming conmunities. The production of coffee in the latter has
developed very satisfactorilyi approximately 75% of the targets fixed
had been reached in l97I both as regards the number of coffee trees
planted and production per tree. As regards food cropst the axlounts
produced and marketed are above those produced outside the farming
conrnunities. The yields, however, remain smal1.
Moreover, the areas devoted to banana-plantations are expanding
steadily and even more rapidly than those devoted to coffee plantations.
The banana plantation is the best form of lnvestment for the farrner
and his greatest source of cash income through the sale of banana
beer, with coffee taking second p1ace. However, banana production
takes up the best 1and, requires an appreciable amount of workt
and creates an imbalance in the farmersr production. The tax system,
however, would seem to enccurage the farmers to produce beer rather
than coffee, since only the latter product is taxed when it leaves
the country1. in 197l., tax accounted for a good quarter of the
producerr s income.
On the who1e, the use made of the project may be consi.dered
satisfactory, despite a deterioration since I972. llowever, the
results obtained call for certain comments on the general thinking
hch i nd thcse nro i ects :
- 
an integrated approach, such as that used in the Mayaga-Bugesera
farming comnunities is worthwil-e - that is every aspect of the
developmenL of producers I holdings must be catered forl
- 
for modernizing the traditional agricultural economyr the provision
of supervisory staff and technical assistance is at least as
important as equipment and land improvement.
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fn the project emphasis was placed - with success - on establishing
the farming communities I creating infrastructure and carrying out
land improvement. Development of the potential of the project and
particularly management matters were somewhat neglected. Consequentlyt
the OtsM, having no resources of its own, is unable as yet to engage
in al 1 the activities earmarked for it and the cooperatives planned
have not yet assumed the role they were assigned.
CHAPTER III
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INTRO}UCTIOII fu'\TD,/OR INCREASE O}' INDUSTRIAL CROPS
fn this group of schemes, projects are in the rnain directly concerned
with developing the quantity and quality of agricultural crops intended.
for industrial processJ.ng in order to meet the needs of local consumption,
develop exports and diversify prod.uction. Their essential aim is to exploit
as fu1Iy as possible the resources of the soil a.nd. climate of the associated
countries where the natr:ra1, economic and social conditions lend themselvi.s
particularly well to the development on a massive scal-e of industrj.alized
crops by combining plantations wi-th processing factories. This type of
project may be aimed at the substitution of local products for imports
or alternatively the export of processed or semi-processed products.
The Associateci Statesl owd.r€ of their opportuniti.es in this fie1d, have
urrdert aken industriali zaiion progranmes directly linked to their agri culturaj.
potential. The Community has constantly encor:raged. these efforts and helped
to finance projects of this type,
1. Development of cotton gz'owing (Senegal)
This project is part of the attempt to reduce Senegal's reliance on
erports of a single crop 
- 
gror:ndnut s 
- 
which represented more than
EO ij in value of the tra.de balance. Cotton growing chosen to offset
at regional and national leve1, the economic preponderance of' growrd-
nuts, was to do more to mobilrae the ma-npower avail-ab1e i.n the
outlying rural areas and procure hi.gher incomee.
ii the marketing of the product a'u the primary staee (ouying from
the local farmers ) ;
iii the introduction of industrial techniques (cotton ginni.ng);
iv sales on the dornestic and international markets.
All these tasks irere entrusted to the Compagni e ll'angaise pour le
d6veloppement aies i'i.bres Textiles (CFDT).
An
to
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In 19/3 the project was examined. in operation and the resuLts show
that it was well conceived. The objectives have been attained as regards
area rrnder culti.vation arrd yietdl in I973/14, Senegal cultivated over
2!000 hectares, producing 33 000 metric tons, in the three areas.
Cotton growing ls therefore established in Senegal, whereas production
was ni1 in I)6!, Seneg:al ts textile industry has not imported cotton
fibre since I)6), and, in 1970 Senegal became an exporter of this raw
material.
assessment of the project shows it to be an undoubied success, due
the combination of a series of favourable factorsr
the advisory body (Crut) had wlde experience of inteneive cultivation
methods in similar regionsl further experi.ence was gained. rith
advance inj.tiation campai gns undertaken with success j,n the reas
concerned;
the ini.tial areas chosea for plantations, Senegal alrd Upper Casamance,
proved particularly suitable for developing cotton, with very
favourable natural conditions and inhabitants eager to increase
their cash incomes;
the organization of the operation was partrcularly well co-ordinatedt
the CFDT monitorising all the activi.ties requj-red for the success
of the projeot: financer production, processing and marketing.
It was ably supported. by the IRCT (lnstitut de Recherches sut Ie
Coton et les Textiles), the body responsible for research related
to the operati on.
The operation is financially so,rnd; it pays for the real costs of
the factors of prod.ucti on (w'ithout subsidi:es) except for expendediture
on organizdion of 1ocal supervisors.
However, the project made only a small contribution to the growth of
the nati-ona1 productl as the opportunity cost of cotton cultivation
in an area of groundnut production is fairly high. This is particularly
true in Sin6-Saloums where ground.nut s arc gtown very extensively; there
is a more marked. contribution to the national product in areas where
groundnut s are g?orrrrt on a small scale.
rL
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The main purpose of the operation was to diversify the Senegalese
economy, and in this respect the project constitutes a valuable insurance
against the risk of a collapse of the market in groundnuts, particularly
as thi,s diversification is flexible in as much as a switch from grorurd-
nuts to cotton, or vice-versa, is always possible at moderate cost.
A few particular poinis d.eserve attention:
The sectoral approach, by single proctud; has i:ndoubtedly been the
most effeotive method of attaining the objectivc diversifying the
economy. Based on the w1de dessimination of rclatively simple
techniguee of intensive cultivation, chosen soIely with a view
to producing the greatest possible quantity of cotton, the
operation seems to representy in the present s:-tuation in Senegal ,
a better solution than the overall approach aiming to transform
all systems of traditional farming. However, as the methoci applied.
was choscn in the light of short-term requirenents, it implies
that the present measu-res constitute only one stage in the longer-
term overall development of the country.
The vertical integration of operations entrusted. to the CIDT repre-
sents a considerable advanta€e, enabling it to coord.inate all its
servicee: prorootion of interest in cot ton-grow'ing, organization
of local supervisors and marketing. The CFDT also monitors
requirements of intermediate products and ensures their supply.
Deducting a fixed. amount of the return on the marketed product,
it has no difficulty recovering debts.
iii The ratio of loca1 supervisors for the cotton project was high
ald they were in cIose, d.irect contact with the local farmers
themselves. Technically, the edvi sory work involved. was rclatively
simple, being centred. on the observance of a cultivation discipline,
for the key to success Lies in the rural promotion programme, which
had first of all to win the local farmerrs support for cotton
growing, and then persuade him to plant cotton on his best land
and give prlority in his time-schedule.
The risk involved in this sort of operation is obvl- orsly the rein-
trod.uction of a form of one-crop system. For this reason stress
is being laid more and more on promoti.on of the need. to rntegrate
cotton in thc farm, the ultimate objective being to transform the
g?owers i.nto genuine entrepreneurs capable of making economic
choices at farm Ievel.
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iv Although the project has got off to a good start, it still has
to overcome a number of difficultiesr the main one being thc
Senegalization of mar'aged.al and supervi-sory staff and of the c ompa4y
itself. The process of replacing staff ia well under way and
an apparently satisfactory method of tralning African supervisory
is being applied. Unlike the traditional system of u.ndcrstudiest
where on expatriate is flanked by his eventual successor for a
fixed period of time, the CFDT integrates candj.dates in the
project by assigning them to a series of posts of increasing
responsibility d.i-rect ly connected with its operations. In this
was its future ad.ministrators feel themselves involved in the
n'^ i a^+ frnm +ha IJe gann]-ng.
The development oompany was
the first six months of L974
semi-publi.c compsxry of which
responsable for a1f aspects
mr v.ket i n;r^
converted into a national body during
by the creation of SODBFITF-X (1)r a
the CFDT and the State are shaxeholders
of the project from production to
2. Selected palm plantat j.ons (Ivory Coast )
The pri.ncipal objec-tive of the Oil-Palm P1an, lauriched in 1?61 by the
Government, was to diversify Ivory Coastsrs agriculture, which relied
too heavily on coffee, cocoa ald bananas, these three products then
represcntinC 80 /" of the total la1ue of Ivory Coast's exports. This
diversi fi. cat i on of agriculture, which reflected- several sources of
oorlcexn r was intented to:
(1) Soci6t6 d.e D€veloppement de Fibres Textiles
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(I) attenuate the ever*present risks of sharp fluctuations j.n the
price of coffee and cocoa;
(II) rcdress the regional imbalances resulting from the natr:raI features
peculiar to the various geographi-caf areas.
The aim of the Oil-Palm Plan was & pfantation of 16 0OO hectares of
selcted palm treess which, when fully operative (from 1!16), would
produce 150 000 metric tons of palm oi1 and 38 000 metric tons of
palm nuts and kernels. The EDF contributed to the aims of this
plan by implementing two projects with sirniliar objectives.
The first project ( fina"rced under the first ED!' and carried out
between 1963 and 1!6!) comprised:
i the crcation of 2 20A hectares of ind.ustrial plantations and
2 !00 hectares of village based pla::tationsl
j.i their maintenance f'or { years;
iii the constructj.on of two palm-oi,1 mi11s;
iv the associated infrastructure and equipment.
The second project (financed under the second F,Dl' and i.mplemented"
between L!6) and 1!12) comprj-sed the planting of 32 oOCr hectares wlth
selected palms. The work involved in setting up the industrial plan-
tations was spread over I years and included:
i plantation infrastructure, tand cfeareace by mechanical deforestationl
ii d.irecting and supervi.sing the works;
iii planting and maintena.nce for two yearsi
iv provision of associated equipmentl
v Drovision of social- infrastructure.
?he location of eight regj-ona1 centres constituting the production
areas consjdered to be most suitable for oi-l-pa1m cultivations was
decided and each centre was provided with one or more ind'ustri al-s cale
blocks to ensure that the mi1ls to be built were supplied. regularly.
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A vigorous promotion oampaign was conducted. with the aid of Sodepalm (1)
to encourage village planters to set up farni 1y luri t s of production'
The two projects were to make j.t possible to:
diversify producers;
satisfy the requirements of d.omestic consumptionr which were not
fully rnet before the inrplementation of the first project;
d.eve 1op exports.
The two projects were Planned to
with the installation of several
a valuable and effective element
project.
comprise a number of measures together
mamagement companies, which const itut e
for the operational integra'bion of the
Serious preliminary studies (2) provided valuable i"nformation and an
indicat j-on of the technical resources requiredl
organization of local- supervisors for plantations, promotion and
ad.visory services was entrusted (for the fj.rst project ) to Satmacr (3);
the running of the two oil-mills was assigned- to Palmindustrie (4);
Sodepalm programmed and directed the work; as a plantation company t it
produces a.nd transplants the plant stock, and looks after rrpkeep
(unti-1 the palm trees become productive) and fualvestingl it also
organizes 1oca1 supervisors for the village plantations and collects
their prod.uction;
pa1mivoire (5) ." responsable for managing both the plantations and
the mi1ls and for marketi-ng production.
(L) State companyr set up in 1!53r implementing Oil-Palm PIa::
(2) Studj.es carried out by the Institut de Recherches pour les
ilui]es et fes Ol6ag:ineux (IRHO);
(3) Government agency responsable for undert aki.ng plantation infra-
structure works, financed. for 8 years by the LDF
({) Semi-public company I in which the State has a majority holdingr set
up ln lyoy
(5) e company in which piivate interests have a majority hold'ing'
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The examination, undertaken in I)12, of the use made of the investments
shows that the inclusion of the two projects, the second of whi-ch j.s
almost completed, in the 0i1-Pa1m Plan, enabled the projects to De
carri ed. out with very effective means and resuLts. Overa1l, the two
projects can be consid,ered an rlnd.eni abJ.e successl the investmente
have contributed to a la,rge extent to the d.iversi fi. cat i on of the
countryrE productionr tb the development of exports and to satJ.sfying
the demands of domestic consunotion.
As regards production, the results appear satisfactory; the industrial
plantations planned. now exist. The socio-econornic effects are j-ndis-
putable; the investments have created 7 O0O new ag?icultural jobs. Under
the general supervision of Sodepalmr more than 10 000 Ivory Coast planters
are now working more than 25 000 hectares of village plartations. There
has been a veritable explosion i.n the number of these village plantations
in recent years .
85 f" of the agricultr-rral workers on the industriaf plantations come from
the Upper Volta. Their possi.bilities of promotion are very limited; the
result is a certain social irnbalance and instability among the least
skilled workers, although their income is far hi-gher than anything
they can expect in Upper Volta. The system of remunerat i. on appli'ed by
Sodcpalm fon this crop enoourages the worker to earn even more than
the minimum guaranteed 1,tage. The average weighted wage of a harvester is
consequently l^4O {' of the annual minimum Suarant eed salary.
The plantations have led to a considerable irnprovemen'b in the social
infrastructure. A prograjnme to provide houses and social facilities
at a cost of more than CI''Atr' 2 00O mitlion is under way.
The undoubt ed success of the operati.ons owes much to the efficiency
of the management companiess which alisplay great competence in the
exerciBe of their fulctions. The formula of comblning the setting
up and operatbn of the industriaf plantati.ons with vigorous promotion
efforts and organization of supcrvisors among the village planters
- 
qn-
has proved. particulariy successful. In 1973 more than 20 rlo of t'he
total produc-bion of frutt clusters cane from village plantations.
could_ the objective of the operation have been achieved with village
-rr-+a*i^-- ^rr-r e This is doubtl es a rralid alrefiIative I however, itl,-LaiI u  u -L \I rD vrrrJ t
has the disad.vantage of not bei"ng able to provide a regular supply for
the oil nill now installed. I{oreover, a programme on this scale can
only be caried orrt in the tirne required by means of a modelll]t rapid'
technique based on incl-ust rial methocls. consequently, the industrial
plantation, which can havc recourse to an aclditional rnass of labourt
is necessarily the best alterr:rative for this type of perennial culti-
vat i onr schedrrled- quantities can be prod"uced on industrial plantationst/r )
l-abour is more pro,lu_ct ive and -che yield" frorn the soi] is higher)-'but
extending the systern to the trad-tional farming conrmrnity has clearly
intensified the operationrs economic and social effects.
It must be noted, however that the success of the projcct is also d"ue
to -bhe favourable state of the international market in vegetable oilso
l. Palm plantation and oil mill at i'{ono \ ljanomey /
llhe a.'i rn o'F the oro iect vra s to u'estore and rnantain the production of
vegetable oi1, which is one of the main resources of the countryrs
econo \}ro This general objective is embodied in the Oil-Plam Planr which
was d rawn up in 1!{J and aims at a better erploitation of paln plantations
by irnproving the plan stock, cultivation techniques and nethods of pro-
ce s s j.ng and disPosalo
This general aim resulted. in an initial large-scale project :
- 
Creation of a plantation unit of 4.OOO ha of selctcd palm treesr to
replace the natural Palm grovest
- 
Crcation of an oi1 mi1l with a production capacity of 6. OOO metric tons
of oi 1.
(t) f" 19?3 the re spe ctive yields of ind-ustrial plantations and- village
plantations were 8.3 tfha and J.5 t/ha.
he 4.000 ha site in the llono va1ley was chosen to put an end to
the isolation of a poor region ; at the same time it reflects the
arrthoritiesr concern to avoid antagonizing the local population by
taking over too much priirate\r owne d" land-. The site l^ras chosen
because of the quality of tha soils, the 1ow-1ying ground and. the
most hurnici area,s being avoided..
fhe self-contained agro-industrial complex set up by this project,
comprising the plantation and the oil mill, was to be managed by
one body along the lines of a cooperative. The system of conpul-
sory cooperative association atternpted to reconcile respect for
individual prope rty with the decisj-on to crtate a large industrial-
style plantation, landowne rs received, in exchange for the land they
contributed, rrAtr shares in the cooperative, whilst work was paid
partly by an adirance in cash and partly by rr3rr shares constituting
capital. Qre A[ share allolbd for 1.5 ha represented a nominal value
of CFAtr' 30 0O0 and- was to bear an intorrest of 3 t/". A rrSrr share implied
the prorrision of at least 20O d-ay s work per year at the cooperative
valued ab 3O0 francs per day, an ad.vance of ll0 francs per day harring
been paido
The ui;ilization of this projcct was thoroughly examined in Lg72/73.
fne results showed I,ha| \ ]OO ha rie re planted with selected palm
trees between L)62 anrl I)66 as scheduled. trhe plantation began
operating uld,er good. conditions. The income distributed during
this period, improved the living conditions of the inhabitants of
the regi onl
On the other hand, production did not reach the level intenrlerl.
In I!11 and. I)12 the production of fruit clusters on selectocl plan-
tations was far below forecasts, because of insufficient rainfall.
Yields were less than I tfha on ave rage. In ad-d.ition, a number of
palm trees have d.ied- and- fallen as a result of the still more ina-
d-equate rainfall of the 1973/4 season. The L)lQ yield will as a
resul-t scarcely reach 2 tons of fruit cluster per ha.
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Asregardsthecooperative,w.ithlabourandothercostsremaining
roughly equal to forecasts, the account s tot LilIf?2 show a d-eficit
of CFAF B million, on a turnover of CFAjl dB millionr although inte-
rest on rtAtt share s and. arnount s due on ttBrt shares were not paid'
The oil rnil1 was not pri into operation rint i I I!Jl, two years behind
schedule, because of tachnical mod.ifications which proved. rcccss&rf,r
Despite ad.justments and technical inprovements, the nj-11 continues
to be a fragile r.rnit requiring oonstant rnaintenance by a highly skil-
Ied staff. Economicallly, the rise in the price of oi1 on the market
and of palm kernels partially offset the reduction in the t orueage
treated. Financial returns from the mill in f97f/72 amounted' to
75 ci ot forccasts, ioeo & profit of CFAF 5t million, but in I972h3
losses were recorrled.
The cooperative fafiners, after a period of relative prospsrityt
we r.e hit all the hard.e r by the harmful effects of thc lack of rain.
T.l:re ir average arrnua,l income frorn the plantation amouvrted to CFAF
2loooinlgT2.Becauseofthelackofland-arrailableforfood
crops on the plantation, their standartl of living depend"s to a
large erbent on this cadrincome, wbich in turn depends rrai.nly on the
ernployment which the cooperative can offer. flris, howevert fe11
from 250 work tl-ays in 1p6! to 14O in 19?3 for each member of the
cooperative, which has had r:vrfavourable consequences' the prepara-
tion of lanrL for food crops, which was not prorrid.ed for in the coope-
rat i.,re stnrcture, wouLd- have made it easier for them to live off
their own production when their cash incomes were low.
leaving aside the questionable choice of thc site of the pla,ntationt
the e:ca,minat ion of the ways in which this project has been used
r.'cveals that the conversion of a peasant economy at the subsistence
stage into a cash econotry is not a siinple taskl It is furthc r com-
plica*ed- in the present case, wherc this ca*r econor\y i.s based sole1y
on one agricultural crop and is therefore entirely at the mercy of
wrfavourable rainfall conditions, for only is rainfall inadequate t
but aLso it is badly distributed ; as a result the region is rmsuited
to the cultivation of selocted- palm trees, despite the presence of
natural palm grove sa
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Although, when this first large oil-paln plantation in West Africa
financed by the @F l^tas planned, insufficient thought was given to
rainfall conditions, the Conmission has nonetheless J-eas11 fron the
experience gained". In ord-er to prov-ide tkie cooperative farmers
with additional cash incomes and" in view of the fact that a marked
improvennent of the situation cannot be expected, a rural development
project is at present being studied. Sitrrated in a adjacent areat
it is intend.ed to intensify food crops, especially maize, and to
obtain better rcsults from the natural pal.rn groves, by the disse-
mination of improved methods of production and complernentarll measurcs
to provi-de rlral equipmentl
What the Commission learnt from the erperience acquired. in the l'{ono
project also influenced the conception of two similar projects in
Dahomey : agro-industrial improvenent s in the Agonw ar"ea and the
Oudm6 ddpartement. Starting with the same objectives, namely plan-
ting selected palrn trees in the form of industrj.al units on the
.basis of cooperatirres of a type sj.milar to that at llono, the plan
provided for the simultaneous preparation of land for food crops.
[his land the cooperative fasners ca& use to satisfy their subsistence
needs and. even to increase their cash incomes.
The first results obtai.ned in the Agonw area, which was prepared
between 796T and L)fQ, arc instructive. Initial\r, the coopcrative
farrners used. only a small part of thc land. available for food crops.
Following a sharp increase in thc d"emand. for manioc flour they have
slntrn a marked inbest in farrning this lando
In the Ou6m6 area (fole-Sua), on the other hancl, the cooperative
farrners showed. rnuch greater interest in food. crops from the startt
especially naize and groirndnut s, than in the plantation of selected
palms, which has boen in preparation since 1973r fhe ttason is that
rnaize was selling at CFrAtrt 2J/kg, and. groundnuts at CFAF 55/Ue in
May I!Jl, and that still higher prices can be oxpected providing
that the products can be stored., wj-th markets in Nigeria continui.ng
to expand.
4.
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This shows how the priccs which the producer can obtain for various
crops, oj.ther on industrial plantations or on peasant holdirgs t
influence his choice between different crops ; these pricee can play
a d.ecj.sive rolc t but thcy can also upsct a wholc rural d"cvclopncnt
policyo Consaqucnt \y r if it is ad'mittecl that it is neccssary and
useful to define a mral developncnt stratesr to attain ccltain spc-
cific goals, the disturbance s which can occur whila the strateg; is
bej_ng applied and can jeopardize lhe achievement of these goals nust
also be taken into consideration.
It would be inter.esting to study this problem in depthr to learn more
about the conrlitions in which agricultural developrnent projects aTc
carried out and. l'rhich can have a decisive influence on the motives
of producers and the d.ecisions which they take in the short and 1on8
t e rroa
Conclusions
Analyoi s of the thrcc projects concerning agricultural crops for
ind.ustrial processing shows that the Senegal and Ivory Coast operations
are u$d.oub*ed successes, since their objectives, namely diversifying
procluction, satisfying doroestic denand better and. improving the trade
balance, have been largely achicvecl. On the other handr the I'Iono pro-
ject in lahomey has proved a failur"e, attributable to tire fact that
the rrgion is unsuited to the cultivation of selected palm troes and
that the rainfall conditions of the past few years have been over-
whe lmingly bad,
The results should- however be clif ferent j-ated- and the problems which
can arise when projects of this type arc plaru1ed should be outlinedr
-))'
ir The choice which has to be nrad.e between an j-ndustrial plantation
(Ivory Coast) and peasanr holdings (Senegal) depends on 'rire crop
selectedr Palm trees call for an industrial plantatron, which
alone can enabl-e prod.uction to be rationalized as nuch as possible
by controlling cultivation, organizing the collection of products,
processing then, etcr OoIy an industrial plantation can produce
c'rffi ^; ont a'ar.*-i ti es tn qr:nnlw the Oi1 ni11 On an eCOnOniC Scalev4}Jyr.,
with fruit clusters for processingr Obviously this type of farming
does not exclude the parallel or subseguent d.eve I opment of pcasant
holdi.ngse f:rcleed, ertensions to the t rad.it onal farming systern can
increase the beneficial effects of the plantation (fvory Coast ).
l"!n* * 
^r, nr.r *ha n{hrl h:rarl i c :r ra arorrr:1 nr"nn :r-rrl Anac nn*'-r 
-- -'- 
i requl-re
the ind-ust rial plantation systen ; subject to regular crop rotation
ancl being quickly and easi\r replaceable, it lend-s itself better to
snall-scale farrningr lhus, co*ton growing in Senega.l, as in the case
of other cotton projects financed by the SF, is rmdertaken solely
on Peasant holdings.
ii. Indust ria.l plantations seem more suitable for observing the cult j--
rra.ti nr riiqninli.rc r.em:i r"ed ln rlerre lon a. ncr^r .7ron fna.lr tfees if:qrovr},rlru vv sv vvrvy q rrvr vrvy
Ivory Coast and Dahomey).
T4li < rr nnr.'n:r nh ha< al<n haar :nnlipd qrrnneqsfrrl lrr tn *ea
'-- 
growrng
projects financed by the DF in Ruranda and. Surtmd.ir If the new
crop selecteC does not lend itself to -che industri.al plantation s,/s-bent
the need for cultivation d.iscipline roust be satisfied by intei:sive
and efficient supervision (cotton, Senega.l).
iii. Superwision is therefore of considerable importance in the case of
peasa.nt holdingso Ttre first step in the intnoduction of cotton in
Senegal was a prolnotion progranme, which has been very effectil'e and.
is no cloulit the basis of the projectls success, vrhereas an advisory
service was responsible for disseminating techniques which wcr€ rela-
tive\r easy to adopt in order to achieve progressive changese For
the erLension of paln pi-antations (Ivory Coast) the c ompagr5r respon-
sibLe has organized a dense network of local supervisors among the
v-i1Iage planters, and its success was consolj-dated by a vigorous
nnamn*iPL v."v urv!. ^-- ,1, - .i,lrJr09 o
-)o-
iv. fn lvory Coast ancl Senegal -the pronotion and. ad.rri so ry work rinde r-
taken has procluced- se cond.ary effectsr namely irnprovements in the
whole system of cultivation and the t raining of responsible pea-
s411-b ryo
vr The vertical integration of all opelati-ons - productionr super-
rri qi n... . nr.ocess.i nc" ar'i ma.v.keti n.." 
- 
i n one c ompaqy (CfOt in Senegal) ,v _L 
-rl,r, t !f vvvuufr!f/
or in several companie s working closely -togpther (Ivory Coast), has
proved to be one of the conditions of suocessr subject however to
the rese:rvations expressed. about CtrDTrs activityo
vi. Tne coope:'a.tive for:rula used. at j'{ono (latromey) is not necessari\r
questionable. I-hd"e r norrnal condj.tions (Oueme and. Agonl,V ) it appears
to function without a4y pa.rticular problemsr
"rii. One of the fault s of the i,Iono project (Dahomey ) was that it vras
baseci on a single industrial crop and. insu-fficient thought vras
given to foocl problemse $rbsequent projects financed. in Dahomey
plans have atrrea{y been desig:ned to permit the sinultaneous
oreparation of land for food crops.
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C}IAPTBR IV 
- 
OUTLINE OF SOITE GEIi'ERAL PROBIEI'IS
what general conclusions may be d.rawn from the study of the agriculture
d.evelopment projects whj.ch have been under review? The particular lessons
which the Commission has already been able to draw from the study have
been set out at the ends of the varj.ous chapters or of the detailed
st udy of the projects themselves. Givenr first of a1lr the complexity
of agricultural deve}opnent ope?ati.ons and, in addition, the limits
of the sample chosen 
- 
1l schemes finances in ! associated countries -
one cannot claim to d.ed.uce from the cases examined all the problems
that may arise during the conceptionr implementation and operati.on
of agricultural development projccts, particularly since the information
so far collected. on the use of the projects examined is not always
complete and sufficiently detailed. !'or these reasons this chapter
makes no claim to deal exhaustively with the problems of agricultural
d.evelopment, but merely constitutcs an outline of the problems connected
with some factors having a bearing on the success of agricultural projects
Generally speaking, agri cultl:ra1 developrnent projects ain at raising
the leveI of agricultural productivity (and sometimes at satisfying
certain internaL requirements in the matter of agri.cultural products)
and, in ad.dition, at improving the livi-ng condrtions of the ruraf
population. It is usual for the latter aim to be pursued through the
increase in incomes xesulting from immediately productive projects.
There j.s a risk, however, of such efforts being compromised- uriless they
also aim at maintaining a socj"al a.nd geographi cal balance by colurteracting
the dj-sturbing phenomenon of rural d.epopulation. Agricultural projects
shoul-d therefore be conrbined with social measures aimed at conferring
upon rural society certain attractive advantages which are usually
limited to urban centres: diversi fi cat i. on of non-agricul,tural activities
(t) fire Commission is endeavouring to fill out its own experience 1n this
respcct by exchanging information with the d-epartments responsible f'or
evaluating rural development projects within other aid bodiesr in
particular those in the Member States.
such contacts are sti11 spasmodic, however, and should be extend.ed. and.
placed on a more systematic footing in ord.er to enable the best use
to be made of all the experi-ence gained i.n this sphere.
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(crai't industries, coinmerce, burlding, etc.) w-ith the object of
increasing the range of.';ob opporuunities and the spread of basic
welfare facj.lities (water supply, rural medical services, improved
housing, eto.)r helping the peasants to come to terms with modern
life (cultural measr.ues, socio-economic promotion) and adapting
education to the requirements and aspirations of rura.1 society.
The conception of any agricultural development operation should't
as far as possible, take j"nto acco',utt the needs of such integrated
development. lhth regard to individual projectsr two factors
wrII receive particular attention, since their influence on
results is immediate aird. direct; first r additional i-ncorne for
the grower and second., supervision methods. Other factors likeIy
to influence the results of agricuLtural projects may be the
subject of a further detailed study, based on a greater varrety of
finished projects.
I . Income and pr_i ce-s_
The pro;ects carried o*t in the agriculturaL development sector
show that the soundest conception and the most careful implementation
11Av corne to nothir- if rha rrpaa'hi i" ynable lO der:.ve suffiCient
additional incor.re from a proposed scneme. Conlrary ro what people
are sometimes to tnink, analyses of the effects of agricultural pro-
jects prove that the expectation of increased remuneratron is
the best incentive for the peasant to work harder in order to
ircrease production aad improve quality or to choose, frotn
among the various possible crops, those 
',vhi ch are most ad.vant ageous
for the nationaf economy as a whole. i'ioreover the extra i.ncome
hoped for influences the sale of products and, consequently
all other activities. i,'urthermore the peasant rnust really be able
to erjoy his increased incorne, j.n other words he must be able
to acquire rn norr.raf lashion such capital and consumer goods
as he desires. There is therefore a link between income from
nTnn rnl.i nrr or,l l-rnc 6 efi ^f ^^'nhe1'gial netWOrkS.
In the li.ght of all this, the conception of agricultural projects
should take into account:
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i. the price paid to the farmer for his productsl
ii the price of the means of production;
iii the yield or the improvement of quality that the proposeo
measure lead to
iv the opportunity coct aincluding the subjec-crve value of'
social activities) of the factors involved in new techniques
or crops i
v the risks inherent in the changes contemplated j.n the structr.rre
production a:rd, r'rhere appropriate of markeiing.
1cl Fri noc
The producer price is one of -rhe principal factors which, ar, the level
of the growerr determine the q-rantity er.rd qualit;r of proCucrron and
cr.rrchn tl^a ciroi r:e oi' arnns r,nd nossi l-le suLstitutes.
The incentive to increase and irnrpove production is restricted
however by the possibilities of extending cuJ.tivated land, the extra
effort and hours of work required, possible supplies of the rneans
ol production (f'erti1:.zers, e-Lc. ) a"d the yielo ot the factors involved.
The choj-ce between d.ifferent crops, where technically possiblet is also
governed by price. In ijpper Volta, for exampler :.n an t) Rf (reg'ional
Development Organization) area of influencer the income from cash
crops lgroundnuts and cotton) was insufficient in marly cases to cover
operating costs. It :.ras oLserved tha.t r consequentlyr 9, i, of peasanl,s
grew the traditional, remu:terative crops - millet, sorghum and
maize 
- 
but only half of them produced groundnut s and cotton.
In this contextr one cannot overlook the fact that it is usual for
producer pri.ce to be extensj.vely influenced by government policyt
for, j.n most associated countries, official purchase prices are
fi vaA hrr rofor onna tn.
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i in respect of food crops, the authoriti es I concern with feeding the
mainly wage-earning urban populati.on at the Lowest possible prices.
The officral consumer price is sometimes even Lower than the price
of identical products imported and delivered to the consurners ("real
pricertleveI);
ii j.n respect of export products, budget requiremerltst paJticularly
in those countries in which there are prati.cal difficulties in the
way of direct t axat j. o:r of alL incorne '
As a result of the priority often given by the governrnents to these
objecrivesr the prices paid to lne growers d'o not always provide
sufficientencouragerientforthei.re|forts;inSotnecasestheyrnay
even indirectly hinder the effec'us serrght after in a proJect'
It is a matter theref'ore of f:-nding, for each countryt a point of
balance bet}reen the various competr.ng objectives of its economic polic;r'
It must be considered. in particular whether it is not too uneconomrcal
to subsidiae, for exarnpier the imported quantities of a product in ortler
to keep the corrsun'er price down, by comparrson with the adva"nt ages which
could result from increasing the domestic purchase price of' the product I'
|or example, certain pro;ects to develop rice-growing in senegaf ran into
ciif-ficulties arising I'rorn the policy oi' excessively low food prices
pursued lry the Governnent. In contrast, fixing the purchase price of
iSroundnut s for dj.rect corrsumption )0 '7' hig?rer than the price of gror:ndnut s
for oif pronipted the peasants of Senegal to sobstitr-b the former ttrpe
for the fatter - all o'Lher factors rernaining equal'
It nrust be acknowled-ged, however, that the peasantsrreactions to
changes are not a hva,ys i',rhoIly rational; they seem to be dictated
chiefly by immed.iately perceptible ef'fects and to take far less
oflong-termaspects'forinstartcethefrrtureincoroewhichmight
lrom inrmediate investments and the capital losses which ini' ght be
long*.term conse{Lrence of ove r-pr oduct i on '
ac crue
I Thi= problern should of course be considered not only in respect
of each product, but also in a wider contextl so that btal levies on
exported prociucts coutinue to be appreciably higher term subsidies
grant ed. for i.rnported products.
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The Commisstonts conclusj.on fronr this analyses was that the manner
of fi xr ng the nri eoo -l-n ro nei,r +.\ n?'Dducers Should 'ce i:.cluded amOng
the elements oi agricul-tural projects, 1n ol:der that the success may
be ensured as far as loossible of projects whrch it has r-een aj?eed to
finance.
r 
- 
\D-^..i +^ ai r i 
--, ^.^,n srrbstitution
Innrcn<r nu tho nli no ' ,' the nr"nrir:nel i c rn i nnor+i 1'- . ^ ^r^drlf r vuf,Le rrivr e t
from the point of vi-ew of the grower, only in so far as adriitional net
i-ncorne increases too. So it is not sufficient merely to rncrease the
producer price witliout paying attenti.on to the circurnstar).ces in which
the desired increase of production can be obta"ined. These circumstances
relate to the cost of tire factors of prc.:duction, j.rr !)artic'llar 
-aootr
or additional labou.I costs, ard the cosr of the j.ntermediate prod+cts
( fr:rti i i zclo co'l on*od caod a..rri nmov'* o*n I ra^ ,i 
-aA +n_* "_ 1r, creas e
the yi.elds from the soil, to exr,end rhe area under cult:.vation or
to ilnprove the quality of the prod -lcts. Sowever, an economic cal c:tlaTlo:1
must be made, ulti:riarely at least, based on tlie reaL scarcrty of the
factorsl. This is r.riry instead" of conti.nuing to d.istribute f'ertilizers
grati s, as was done r.rnder certair, pro.Tar[nies of aid. to prod.rct:.on
(second EDir), the Comrnrrnity and the A.ASI;I consid.ered it rnore realistic,
under the third. EDI', to provide a temporary d.iminishing subsrdy for
the introduction of the use ot fertilizers, and only within the
fr.amcwnr.k nf nr.niaat.- 1,.-r.i y 
- 
,-^- 1 ,t^ Fi rad nl.roa+i rroo
^ 
vr yl, vJ\rvu- wrirr-usa-Ltrsl.f vvrjEUJrvcb.
Obvrously, however, a projectts viability d.epends on the peasant t s
continuing to rLse the intermedr.ary products. Slncc he nust purchase
these products at his own expense, one the l]ltroductory phase has end.ed
the establrshment of' an ag?icultura] credit system is part: cularly
importa"nt and should., where necessary, be incfuded in the proJect.
1*' The price of the intermediary products shoul-d therefore be as
objecti.ve as possible. Irrhere the cost of such products i-s charged.,
i-n the form of a fee, by a development or marketing companyr_ care
must be taken that ihe producer nevertheless has at his disposal
data on which the base the calculations relatins to his farm.
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The ratio of net addi-tional i-ncome to the extra ef'fort required also
governs the gror.rerrs choice where rt j"s a question of replacing
traditional production by a new crop or introducing a new crop in
additi,on to the custornarY ones.
Thus, in Senegal , the farmers of Sind-Saloum were rather refuctant
to introduce cotton as a substitute for groundnuts, since the net
ad.diti-ona1 return was not suffi.cient to encourage them to make the
change, wj-th all the risks that would entail in the eyes of ureducated
peasants, for cotton requires strj-ct cultrtal discipline and more
hours of work than groundnuts. In contrast, in Haute-Casamance and in
eastern Senegal, the same operation was r.rndertaken in identical con-
ditj,ons arrd was successful tha:rks to the high yield of cotton and
the Lovler cost of substituting it for groundnuts r which combination
provided a distinct iucrease of income for the producer.
This example denonsirates that the opt:-mum producer price depends
on -rhe economic siturtion of rh' country and -rhe region in questiont
and that it j.s also depen,i'nt on production alternatives and
calculation of the "psycho lcgi cal t' price which the peasant puts on
his own labour, together with the risks bound upr in his eyest
vdth any innovation.
To sum up, in the light of experience gained from finished projects
wi"th regard to the influence of price and income the Commission has
exerted its influence on the governments of the associated cowrtries
to persuade them in planni.ng new agricultural projects:
i seek to reconcile the competrng economic aspects in fixing the
nrndrrnor nni novr tvv t
(r) 'oy fixing the producer price at a suffici-ently rem'.rnerative
level,
(t ) by taking into account the opportuniiy costs of production
in the various areas concerned;
ii co:rcern rhemselvcs with the price oi' the means of production, so
that the peasant bas an adequate margin of econotnic profitability;
- 
6l 
-
iii concern themseLves ',rrit h the supply of the means of production and
facilitate the purchase of intermediate prod-ucts by setti-ng up
an agricultural cred-it sYst em I
iv concern themseLves with the marketing of addi.tional production
(r) ly taking overall demand and its trends into accoult when
drawing up the Proj ect t
(t) lV providing the producers with a gua'ra.nteed market within
reasonable limit s;
v concern themselves especially with
in order to permit an lmprovement
labour and in his fixed caPi.*'al.
management training methods
of the return on the Producerr s
2. XS!gl"_l"fo"
The aim of supervisory work is to increase agricultural proiuctivityr on
the one hand directly by informing the f'armers of the possibilities
of'fered by new teclvriques, rneans and crops a:rri encouraging thern to
adopt them and, on the other har:c, by encouraging the farmers 1o adopt
' such attitudes and managernent rnethods as 'rill enable them, rnd.epend'ent 1y t
to make progress in the future. Supervisiorr schemes must therefore also
i,dentify any obstacles particular to agricultural activity or that
provides social , econonic, ecological or cultural- environment and which
hamper changes making for greater agricultural productivity. once
identified, these obstacles must be elimi-nated as far as possible by
appropriate efforts on the part of the farmers themselves or by systematrc
action by the public authorities (research, structural ref'ormsr maior
investments, etc).
supervision must be orientec. towards these functions as a whole and nott
as was often the case before, confred to the first of them. firrtherrnore t
the conception of supervisory work must be adapted to each individua]
project and fi.tted j.nto the general context of the operation. The
effectiveness of any supervisj.on scheme depends on the real avaiLability
of other means leading the sane goodr for instance the supply of
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means of production and finance, the proper fgnct ioning of the rrarketing
systen, and. stage-by-stage prograru0ing t owards a more mod.e rn anal Eynani c
1farrn st mctur€ etc'.
The nat ure of the supe rv'ision work is alsc depend.ent on :
i the type of agricultural d-evelopment sherne planned';
ii the rnaqy technicall econornic and sooial aspects affecting the
derre lopment in que st ion;
iii the expected. rate of change i.n the r'-rral environment.
fhe conception of the superwision work must go even furbher and take into
accoryrt actlon in other sectors which affect rura,l deve loprne nt - in same
cases with ulfavourable r-esults : these include public health selvicest
elenentary and technical cducation, social services (adult education for
example)r public worksr water eng"ineering, etc.
(a,) Sectoral or regiorial schemes
The sectoral scheme aims to increase the prod-uction of one particular
crop. The main aim of .*pervisorxr work here is to give instrrrction
only in those techniques which rc1ate to the crop in question. Expe-
rience in Senegal has shown the limits of such a method. Contrary
to what was thought, such techniques carrnot simply be extre,polated
from other agricultural actiuities unless they are nodified through
a range of accompanying neasures. F\rr*he rmore r aLl new schenes of
this type now lnc lude food. crops, which must be given priority in
any agricultural deve lopnent project.
Reg"ional schemes aim to transforrn tre,ditional farming systems : an
erL"mple of tnis is the ORDs (Regional Developnent grganizations) in
Upper Vo1ta. Supe riri so ry l{o rk in such sohemes must involve advice on
and instruction in genem,l techniques in ord.er to create modernized
l Thu rr'y problems re 1at ing to these other means are not dealt with
in this sunma ry chaPter.
fams which can rnake their own choices as to crops in the li-ght
of the actual possibilities and on the basis of technical and.
economic criteria ained. at making the work done and. the prod-uct ion
factors as profitable as possible.
[he gaps in supervision of sectora,l schemes can be narrowed if the
techniques taught also bring in al1 other aspects of the fanno The
sectoral scheme can almost becone regional in scope. The problems
of the rragional schene, however, are more ooroplex and harde r to solvel
they will be d-ealt with belowo
(b) Technical. 
.economic and social aspects
tnho annnan* i nn a{
-., -.1 supervisory work in rural areas €:ove rned by the
diversity and complexity of the factors involved 
- 
require s the lvhole
progranme of action to be precisely defined 1.
' The main features of the programrne should be:
the techniques to be taught, on a crop-by-crop basis and. in a
ci rravr nrvl a r.br v vr. vr*vr t
the possibilities of regular and s,fls r{uat e supplies of the means
nf nrni rr a* i nnr
the means of processing to be installed at the level of the producer
and./ or the schene Ithe orga.nization of rnarket ing, on a prod.uct basisl
agricultural credit organizat ion and. re sources I
a preci.se and d.etailed. tfunetable for inplementation of the programne;
the orp,nization of supen'isory work and the tasks to be carried-
out at each level;
the amount of superrrision requi rred., in terns of the numbe r of inst rrrc-
tors and the numbe r of n,eeti.ngs with the farmersl
the methods which are suitable for ensuring that the techniques are
rea11y understood and that instruction is given und.e r the best
psychological conditions I
the approach to be ad.opted by the superyisor t owards the farrners
+ither the selection of indiviiLuals to act as leaders or mass ins-
tnrctionl
superyisoly staff 
- 
nunbe rs and composition grassoots advLsers, ins-
tructors, sector head.s, regional orga,nize rs r technical assista,nts -
schedules for establishing the supervision nachine ry and- for neplacing
erpat riot officials;
the t raining progra.mme for supe rwisory stafflthe systern *hereby the supervisory staff assess their own work.
Thus, superwision in nrra.l areas can on$ be useful provided that
the new techniqries are assimilated by the people in question and
there is no longer a4y conflict with traditional values and nethods.
A scheme will be much more effective i.f it star4s off by meetings
the urpnt needs and harne s sing the motivation of the farmersr moti-
vation and takes accorrnt as far as possible of existing social, cul-
tural and occupat ional structures, using the impetus of the latter to
work towards its own sims '. A well-conceived superwision scheme
wj.II thercfore be one r^rhich give s top priority to satisfying a need'
which the populat ion feels to be urge nt (water supplies, a recLuction
in conrnercial fa,:rning, a g:'eater lenety of food cropsr etc. ) and only
second. place to the schemers specific airn (incrraased rna rket prod.uctiont
the fight against soil erosion, the developnent of wrexploited
r€sourcesr et c. ).
The outlining of a basic stratery for supervision is well beyond
*ho qr:rne of this 1s -rn r'l - r.rh i nh ca.n oo no furthe r than cla,rifyr,rr(r "rvv.!Jv - r yvL v
certain specific points which are of pa. r'b icular importance for
irnproving the conception of supe !\ri s ion' Th'e se inprovenent s are the
fmit of the experievles acquired in previous projects and the
Corunission is devoting the greatest attention to then.
1 
-q.ccorurt will therefor"e be taken in
of the following:
denographi c and ethni c st nrc-bure s I
local authorities and their powerst
deve lopment I
systern of land tenure I
social st rr.rcture s, in particular the
authorities and. the division of the
the diffe rent age- groupsi
the conception cfl suPervisory work
pa:ticularly as rcgards rr.ual
role of t radit ional and nrode rn
workload. between the sexes and
existing oocupational st ructure s I
traditions, custoros and relig"ions I
factors afiecting the supenrisorts image with the populationl
the role and irnage of the nassmedia (rad-io, filrns, etc.).
- 
ot 
-
For a project to develop rice-growing in lliaI i supervision was planned
in clear-out stages. The method of cult ivat ion was a virtually new
one and. inst rurct ion needed to be given to farne rs who we le familiar
only with traditloral methods of rice-growing. The supervision was
extremely well planne d and. took account of the need for a gradual
progression through the varicus stages of theoretical and applied
lcrowle<ige. Instruction was given in four stages, each corresponding
to a diffe rent de gree of techlicali.ty : obse rvance of the crop
calendarl preparat ion of the seed. bed and introduction of the harrow
sowing in rows with aniu-a1-d.r'awn seeders and weeding machinery, mineral
fe rt iIi ze rso
In Senep.l the suocess of the cotton scheme was due to the larp
numbe r of instrrrctors dealing with the farrners d.ire ct and teaching
them relatively sinple techniques. However, it has emerged that the
four years of intensive superrrision planled are insufficient to
conve r* the farms, but this i.s ha rdly surprising given the t irne needec
to bring about st rrrctura,l change even in aelvanced economies.
In Uppe r Volta (aid. for the ORD - Regional Development Organi zatlon)
the nrain advice whlch the farroers have adopted- from the instmctors
is the use of fertilizers and plant protection products and also
sowS-ng in rows, al*hough the sowing tirnetable is rare ly kept to.
fhe farme rs prefer to devote most of their efforts to food cropst
which are their najor concem.. Gene ra11y speakingr the schemes pro-
posed should fit in properly with the farmerrs p rograrune of work and
should take accor:nt of all his needs (includiry fooC requirements)
and, his social activit j-eso
-oo-
The effectiveness of superwision is deternined by the nr:-mbe r of
times the farme r is contacted. In Upper 1lo1ta fre quent and. regular
contact has led to a noticeable increase in the use of rnore produot ive
method-s (fertilizers, animal-d rawn ti11ing, etc.) and yields have
therefore riseno lrregular contact on the other ha.nd has the effect
of conside rab\r reducing the effectiveness of supervision. It is thus
inporbant to provid.e not only a sufficient numbe r of supeffisory staff
but also the rneans to ensure that contact with the farme rs is on a
regular basis and at reasonably short intervals.
If supervisi.on is to be effective not only must new techniques be taught
but impor.Lance must be attached to the way in which they are applled
In Upper Volta, for example, after a national infornat ion cannpaign
ancl increased instruction in the protection of seeds and c]lopsr an
aveyage of six farme rs out of ten were using plant protect j-on productst
but onLy four out of ten were ar,rar€ of the exact quantities needed.
The instructor is often justifiably anxious about job security and
status (i11-aef ined functions ',rithin the pro ject r inadequate ren,"rne 1a-
tion, the lack of a statute, etc.). This 1ead.s hirn to concentrate on
quantity and spectacular rre sult s to the det riment of quality. The
project must, therefore, be thought out in such a way as to provide
a r:easonable fratneworlc for supe rwi sory staff to work in' fn certain
cou:rtries such a franework has been provided by integrating supervisory
staff into the civil selvice of the count ry i.n question'
since the nunbe r of field r4orke rs is limited by oost, in-'de pth activities
rnust be encouraged. as far as possible, and carre must be taken to ensure
that their duties consist of supervision alone and do not entail otherst
such as account i.ng, stock control, recovery of firnds t etc. lioreovert
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the impact of supervisory activi.ties can be eriranced by selecting
farme rs to act as r'liirlcnen'r by clemonst:ating the results obtained
when advice on ne r,{ metirod.s is folLor^led- 1.
Superwisory activities should also be helped by the rnedia. lLlthough
it sornetines cones up aga,inst the problem of cowrtries wheie a
large numbe r of langr:age s ar€ used, re,dio is a priveleged nediurn in
that it can broadcast nessages to all areas at low cost. l,lhile the
instnrctor give s advice and- d.emonstrates new techniques in the fieldt
radio can put the farming population as a whole in the picture and
repeat the inforrnat icn provided. ftte se means of cornrnuni cat i on will be
rnost successful lrhen used togetherr proviCing they are properly
coordinatedo
Supervisors often tend to give priority attention to these at the
top of the traditional hierarcl5r, name Iy the biggest landowne rs and
Ioca1 notablesr However, the latter d.o not necessarily set an exantple
for the rest of the ppulation, in nar$r cases they hanrpe r or even bring
about the re jection of *he proposed innovation. 0n the other hand t
if the real leaders of the farrning community adopt the new methods '
so will the majority of the population, although the sociologica,l
investip,tion nee<led to pinpoint these leaders and to select those
farmers who should be given instruction as a nratte r of priority has
not so far been sufficient\r method.icalr
In this connection therre is one factor that is ove rlooked. too often
- 
supenrisors lodge at the homes of irnportant people in the conmrmity
and. are thereforre classed by the rest of the rillagers as being nore
or less tied to their hostso
1 A 
"y"t"* whe reby a large nurnbe r of farue rs superyise 
and- train
themselves with the help of fanne rs picked to demonst re,te techniques
and auxiliary ad-visory staff has been tried out, for example, in a
rura1 development project in Nigero Its success depend.s on how far
the population participates, although this is ensured- by the farmers
collective albeit freel nerabership of the existing cooperatives.
-?o-
Fhe re is a dange r, thereforel of their beconing caught up in the
social tension of the village and" thereby losing part of their
aud.ience. fhis shows the i.mportance of ad.opting a lsycho-sooiological
rathe r than a purely technical, approach to slatters of supewision.
fhe directives given to instructors al\e often inadequate at all 1eve1s
of the ope rat ion. In order to avoid misunde rstandings and effects
contrary to those i-ntended, the langua,ge and- concepts to be used' at
each stage should be mad.e clear and there should be eysternatic che cks
to see that the me ssag€ has been unde rst ood at every levelr
supewision of agricultural projects should be worked out in such a
way as to take accourrt of other structures conrrected uith various
aspects of the d-eveloprnent of the nuaL enri rorme nt or which have
a strong, though pe rhaps indirect, inf h:ence on such development :
political ancL administre,tive orp,nization (way in which the village
authorities are appointed, system of land tenure, etc.)1 social
services ( instruction for vrornen, teaching adult s to read. and. writet
etc.)' teaching (the paru it can play in stopping young people from
leaving the land), health (the reduction of endemic diseases in par*i-
cular) , public works department and. water board. (in particular for the
provision of gooit quality drinking water). Ttre influence exerted. by
the se r,,ari-ous st ructure s should. be made t o have conve rgent effe ct s
and they shoulcl be coordinated, partlcular\r at vi.I1age levelr by
refe rence to the objec-bives set in the deve lopment prograrurne s.
The orp,nization of superwision inplies finding a solution to the
problem of the spe cialization of supervisory staff. Even if teams
of instructors cove ring severa,l subjects arre formed (as in the ORDs
Regional Derreloprnent Orp,ni.zat ions ) in Upper Volta or in the Niger
project r€fe rr€d. to above ) there is no r€ason wtgr each of thern should-
not specialize to a certain ertent. If techniques need. to be taught t
speoialization rnay even be essential.
(")
|.,1
fhe selection of senior supewiscry and technical assistance staffr must
clearly be based on technical ability, but just as important a crj.terion
is their ability to teach, si-nce superwision necessarily involves the
systematic and. cont inuous t raining of junior and nid.d.le rnnagement.
The list of findings and pre.ctical conclusions on -rhe subject of super-
vision could well be erbended; it sentes to show the diversity of the
probleme involved., which nust be examined systematically and in cletail
so that the conception of projects can be improveo with fuII knovrleclge
of the fact s.
Rate of chan,qe
fire conception of superwisory work necessarily clepencrs on the rate of
change expected. Hor.i long supervision lasts depends on the complexity
of the changes t o be brought about and- on the I'.no tv r- e ii,e and auaptabilr by
of the farrne rs themselveso In Senegal, fo:' exarnple, ihe UFDI envisaged'
,q.rli nlanc j rre s':ne.-rrisron n-or,io4 nf oor:r vears fot' the introd-uction cfv ! 4Pv r
cotton gro'.Lng alone. 3ut is this long enough to brrng atro'rt the i.esireo
change in farrning methocls ? It is perhaps onL,y if priccs are sufficiently
attractr.Ve to encourage the farme rs to nnke the change. In the light of such
questions therc should. be sone systematic thinkinS on hoiv 1cn3 supeyrision
must cont inue in order to t:e,nsf orn the traditional rural set-upr gi"tren
the perpetually rising costs of supe'visory *otk 1 and. technical assis-)tance *.
' Annual cost of CtrDT advisory services i-n Sene6'a.1
10 O00 per he ctal€
' Calculations made by the EDF show *hat the cost
in 1975 nitl be \J/" nigher Linan in 1959.
. 
- 
nn rn.ri ma * r, lrr C?rF
. ev! t v-!r'rrg v
of technical as sistance
- [. -
ft is at aLl events certain that any progranune must provide for the
Africanization of supenrision and the institutional organization. ft
iq thp rs"f nr"e i mnolta.nt for technical- assistance to:
i be involved in the execution of the proiect only whe rre nat ional staff
are not yet avai lab1e I
ii prcpare for i-cs d.eparture by training nationals to replace it. The
trad,itional approach is that r,rhe reby each erpatriate works side by
side l"rith the national who is to tal;e over from him after a g"iven
period of time, but what the Conmission is ad-vocat ing i.s a system
rvhich, as far as possible, integrates nationals in the nrruring of
the nlnieci a.nd entrusts then with direct rre spons iTri li.ty which t"ri11w-rv yrvJvvv
grad.ually be stepped. up so that, u1t inrat eIy, the more capable arnong
theni can take over the jobs provisionally carrieC out by tcchnical
assistance staff.
tr'urthe rrnore, the conception of the project should attempt to establish
the technioal, economic anci administrative structures which will be
rcquir€d to cont inue the d.:relopnent scheme as a viable venture after
C ornrnrmity aid. has ceased.
To surn up, it transpires from what has been stated above that argr
agricultura.l project must pay particular attention to superwisi-on
and the faruerrs incolne, rrrhi ch are dete rui-ning and- complenentary
factorsr .{r1y increase in agricuLture.l productionr r^rhethe r by transfor-
ming st rrrctur€ s or increasing yields, can on\r last if effective super-
vision brings about a forward movement generated- by the fatmerrs convic-
tions about the new techni.ques he has assimi-1ated-. Supervision rnust nott
howeve r, be confined to j.nt roclucing new techniquesl 1t must also ensure
that the new metho<is of production which it propaptes provJ.cle the
farrne r r.rith sufficient additional income 
- 
the only lasting incentive 
-
and ensure that he does not a.bandon the technical improvement s or new
crops once supewision tails off. This is the only way of ensuring
the long-tenn success of the project.
Supe rvision must, therrefore, concern itself wlth the way in which
producer prices are fixed, with the prices of and the possibilities
of supp\ring lnternediate product s r with the availability of basics
such as land-, water, etc. and also with the otp.nization of market ing
and credit. l'he conception of supewisory work in all its complexity
rnust occupy a key place in the pnspa.rat i on of each agricultural develop-
ment pro ject.
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ANNEiG
Liste tlss projets dot$ les conilitlons drutiligation font ltobl6t
drune pr6eentation dans ce rapport
COIE DIII/OIRE
DAXOIEY
EAIJTE-VOL,TA
}IADAOASCAR
MALI
IIIAI]RITAI{IE
No corstable
12.21 .5A8
215.cF6.04
225.@5.1 2
12.21 .602
12.21 .7A
1 2.21 .?Ol
12.4.745
21 1.0O9.09
12o24o't ',3
211 .cr,O.n
i 2.24.'l 09
12.24.1 2A
a 1.01 0.1 5
12.?1 .381
1 2r21 o 30-1
12.21 .n?
215.01 z,Ai
5.169
1*\
31 .674' ,,
/*)3o2l!\ z
f*l
5.241 "
380
1.599
7.793
939
2,)12
387
516
4.835/* l9.716."
115 /*\1.iO5' '
734
/*)1.332' '
Intitul6 des pro.iets
Palniers d hul1e
Crriation de 32.OOO he de
me rei.e s s6lect lonn6es
Cr6ation de 32.OOO ha de
n€rsies (pr€t sp6cial)
Pa] rnersies et huilerle de
par-
pal-
palne
Construction d.e J barrages
iiult barrage s en terre
Construction de barrage s nlreux
Mise en 'yaleur r6g"i on du latenga
Arud:,agerent lgrti lc+gricole du
dol'ta d.e ltAnony
Erlensi on loise €n 'laleur delta
de LrA:rorry
An€nagement hytlro+gricol€ d.u
p6rinit rp d.e S oavina
Ara6nagement du Bas-l4angolgr
Amdnag,enent du Bas 
-l'iangolq;
An€nagenent do 1 6 roare s
Trois aro6napnent s rizicoles
An6nagenents hyciro.agricole s d.ans
1e B raJoa
Barrages dans lrEst de la
llauritaaie
(*) Montant glcbaL des trBrch6s
;ts -
IfiAI{DA
SESE0AI/
SURI}{AM
11 r1 2o@1
11 rl 2r@5
12o'l2tOO5
12.12.097
11 r1 21006
1511 2r0@ A
1 2.1 2.01 3
211 .O1{.10
?1 1 rO1 4.28
212o21 4c41
n1.c'.4.35
?15.O15.O5
?.5.O15.19
'l 2.41 ,'l 01
I 2.41 .103
Etude rolse en valeu! du Uayaga-
B]r€esere
Carte p6dologiqus du l$raga-Bugesen
Mise ea valeur du Dlayap-Bugesen
Misc en \raLeur du layaga
Etude an6ragen€!* {trstrsrongo
Dlrection des t rsvaur niso ea valeur
du llayaga-Sugesela
ltlse en valeur du Bugesere (1er
p6rinEtre)
Mlee en valeur du !,layaga (4 nortnea,tx
p6rinbt res d.e paysannat )
Infragt nrcture sociale d€e
IryeanDBts du !'faYaga
D6wloppenent r6gional du
Mayaga-zues€ra
Arn6nage roo nt s lgrdro-agri cole s
lVi cke ri.e
fui6nage rnent s l5rdro+gricolss de
Tijgerkeerk-West
D6rrelopperoent dulture du coton S6ndgal 
,.961 (*)
oriental et Haute4asanance I
D6veloppement de la crrltury coton- r.035(*)nli ne intensirre au Sin6-Sa'.or:n )
682
40
2J5
257
zl3
55
261
f*\1.043\ i
1*\
tx)
427 "
1.g8g
M3
(*) Montant global d.ee 0arch6s
